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WHEN “TESTING THE WATERS” TESTS THE 
LIMITS OF COORDINATION RESTRICTIONS:  
REVISING FEC REGULATIONS TO LIMIT 
PRE-CANDIDACY COORDINATION 
Marc E. Klepner* 
 
During the preliminary stages of the 2016 presidential election, many 
prospective candidates took an active role in the Super PACs that would 
eventually support them after they became candidates.  The regulatory 
system in place provides clear restrictions on Super PACs’ abilities to 
coordinate with candidates; however, what is less clear is whether such 
regulations restrict the behavior of individuals during pre-candidacy, 
known under Federal Election Commission (FEC) regulations as the 
“testing-the-waters” phase.  This Note gives an overview of the laws and 
regulations governing Super PACs, as well as the regulations and FEC 
guidance concerning when an individual becomes a candidate.  This Note 
then examines the lawfulness of noncandidate coordination with Super 
PACs through an analysis of FEC Advisory Opinion 2015-09.  Lastly, this 
Note advocates for further regulation and proposes several new regulations 
that should be adopted by the FEC to restrict this type of precandidacy 
conduct. 
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INTRODUCTION 
“Should I choose to be a candidate . . . [m]y lawyers love that, when I 
say, we’re exploring a campaign, should we choose to run [for President],” 
joked Governor Scott Walker while speaking to a crowd at the Conservative 
Political Action Conference in late February of 2015.1  Although Governor 
Walker did not announce his candidacy until July 13, 2015,2 during the 
preceding eight months, Governor Walker surely looked like a candidate, 
traveling the country courting major donors and party leadership,3 giving 
 
 1. Governor Scott Walker Remarks at CPAC (C-SPAN television broadcast Feb. 26, 
2015), http://www.c-span.org/video/?324557-12/governor-scott-walker-remarks-cpac [https: 
//perma.cc/J4MH-692M]. 
 2. See Samantha Lachman, Scott Walker Announces He’s Running for President in 
2016, HUFFINGTON POST (July 13, 2015, 7:06 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ 
2015/07/13/scott-walker-2016-_n_6186362.html [https://perma.cc/828D-84Y9]. 
 3. See Peter Hamby, Scott Walker Backs Pathway to Citizenship at Private Dinner, 
CNN (Mar. 27, 2015, 6:00 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2015/03/26/politics/election-2016-
scott-walker-immigration/ [https://perma.cc/G2VS-UE4X]; John McCormick, Scott Walker 
Courting Mitt Romney Donors After Slamming Candidate Romney, BLOOMBERG (June 10, 
2015, 4:37 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/politics/articles/2015-06-10/walker-courting-
romney-donors-after-slamming-candidate-romney [https://perma.cc/V8AY-BKBL]. 
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speeches in key primary states,4 and even setting up an office in Iowa as 
early as February 2015.5  However, instead of stating the obvious and 
announcing his candidacy, much to his lawyers’ satisfaction, Governor 
Walker consistently maintained that he was simply “exploring” a run for the 
Presidency,6 or as it is called under Federal Election Commission (FEC) 
regulations, “testing the waters.”7  All the while, the independent 
expenditure-only political action committee—commonly known as a Super 
PAC8—supporting Governor Walker raised over twenty million dollars by 
the end of June 2015.9 
As Governor Walker not so subtly alluded by referencing his lawyers, 
this delay in officially declaring candidacy was no accident; rather, it was a 
calculated strategy.  Unlike candidates and other PACs, Super PACs can 
raise unlimited funds from individuals, corporations, and labor unions and 
spend unlimited amounts in support of candidates.10  On the other hand, 
Super PACs are restricted from coordinating with the candidates they 
support.11  However, whether these coordination regulations apply to 
individuals before they officially become candidates is unclear.12  Thus, 
Governor Walker’s lawyers “love” when he avoids calling himself a 
candidate because, by purporting not to be a candidate, he can exploit the 
testing-the-waters phase to circumvent campaign finance restrictions that 
are triggered when an individual becomes a candidate. 
Governor Walker is not alone in utilizing this creative pre-candidacy 
strategy.  During the preliminary stages of the 2016 presidential election, 
many prospective candidates pushed the boundaries of campaign finance 
laws.  Instead of using this pre-candidacy period to determine if candidacy 
is viable,13 these prospective candidates exploited the testing-the-waters 
phase to prepare for candidacy without the burden of coordination 
restrictions.  Such preparation took many forms.  Several prospective 
candidates played an active role in the formation of a single-candidate 
 
 4. See John DiStaso, New Hampshire Primary Source:  Is Scott Walker Serious About 
New Hampshire?, WMUR9 (July 16, 2015, 6:00 AM), http://www.wmur.com/politics/new-
hampshire-primary-source-is-scott-walker-serious-about-new-hampshire/34188724 
[https://perma.cc/6RM9-TL8N]; Andrew Shain, 2016 in SC:  Scott Walker Visiting Four 
Cities This Month, STATE (Mar. 2, 2015, 5:32 PM), http://www.thestate.com/news/politics-
government/politics-columns-blogs/the-buzz/article13741355.html [https://perma.cc/6MMC 
-7XR7]. 
 5. Jennifer Jacobs, First 2016 Presidential Hopeful to Open an Iowa Office:  Scott 
Walker, DES MOINES REG. (Feb. 10, 2015, 5:36 PM), http://www.desmoinesregister.com/ 
story/news/elections/presidential/caucus/2015/02/10/scott-walker-first-to-open-iowa-office-
among-white-house-hopefuls/23173785/ [https://perma.cc/W84T-LAMD]. 
 6. See Governor Scott Walker Remarks at CPAC, supra note 1. 
 7. See infra note 76 and accompanying text. 
 8. See, e.g., Richard Briffault, Super PACs, 96 MINN. L. REV. 1644, 1644 (2012). 
 9. See FEC Form 3X, Report of Receipts and Disbursements, Unintimidated PAC Inc., 
at 3 (July 31, 2015), http://docquery.fec.gov/pdf/010/201507319000485010/201507319 
000485010.pdf [https://perma.cc/86XT-JTLG]. 
 10. See infra Part I.B.1. 
 11. See infra Part I.B.2. 
 12. See infra Part II.B. 
 13. See infra note 80. 
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Super PAC—a Super PAC that only supports one candidate—whose 
purpose was to support that individual during candidacy.  This active 
involvement included appointing that Super PAC’s leadership, where such 
prospective candidates often placed close advisors and former aides at the 
helm.14  Several candidates reportedly also shared their plans and strategies 
for candidacy with that Super PAC, developing their campaign platform in 
conjunction with the Super PAC’s leadership.15  Lastly, and perhaps most 
commonly, many Super PACs filmed footage of prospective candidates 
during the pre-candidacy phase and subsequently used that footage to create 
advertisements supporting the candidates after they officially declared.16  
All of these actions would almost certainly be unlawful coordination had 
the individuals engaged in the conduct while they were officially 
candidates.17 
The rise of this testing-the-waters circumvention strategy was well 
documented by the media,18 and many accused these prospective candidates 
of violating campaign finance law;19 but is this sort of pre-candidacy 
conduct illegal?  On September 15, 2015, campaign finance lawyer Marc 
Elias, on behalf of House Majority PAC and Senate Majority PAC—two 
Democratic PACs—posed several questions to the FEC in an advisory 
opinion20 request concerning the legality of this conduct.21  In his request, 
Elias asked for clarification on whether testing-the-waters candidates are 
subject to existing coordination regulations and whether such conduct in 
and of itself triggers candidacy.22  Despite the seemingly obvious need for 
guidance, the FEC promulgated Advisory Opinion 2015-0923 in response to 
Elias’ request, but failed to obtain the required majority and left these 
questions unanswered.24 
Part I of this Note examines the origin of Super PACs, discusses the 
regulations controlling Super PACs, and analyzes the relevant regulations 
 
 14. See infra Part II.A. 
 15. See infra Part II.A. 
 16. See infra Part II.A. 
 17. See infra Parts I.B.2, II.B.2. 
 18. See infra Part II.A. 
 19. See PAUL S. RYAN, CAMPAIGN LEGAL CTR., “TESTING THE WATERS” AND THE BIG 
LIE:  HOW PROSPECTIVE PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATES EVADE CANDIDATE CONTRIBUTION 
LIMITS WHILE THE FEC LOOKS THE OTHER WAY 8–29 (2015), 
http://www.campaignlegalcenter.org/sites/default/files/Testing_the_Waters_and_the_Big_Li
e_2.19.15.pdf [https://perma.cc/GL4R-EFR7]; infra note 149 and accompanying text. 
 20. An advisory opinion is the mechanism by which a requestor can ask the FEC to 
comment on certain specific proposed activities before engaging in said activities. See 2 
U.S.C. § 437f (2012) (transferred to 52 U.S.C.A. § 30108 (West 2015)); infra Part II.B.3.  
An advisory opinion is compared with a matter under review, which is the mechanism by 
which the FEC administers its enforcement powers, determining whether an individual or 
group violated campaign finance law. See 2 U.S.C. § 437g (transferred to 52 U.S.C.A. 
§ 30108). 
 21. See infra Part II.B.1. 
 22. See infra Part II.B.1. 
 23. FEC Advisory Opinion 2015-09 (Senate Majority PAC and House Majority PAC) 
(Nov. 13, 2015) [hereinafter AO 2015-09], http://saos.fec.gov/aodocs/2015-09.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/8K62-4QJM]. 
 24. See infra Part II.B.3. 
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and FEC guidance governing when a testing-the-waters candidate becomes 
a candidate.  Part II first gives an overview of the ways in which certain 
individuals—then prospective candidates, later official candidates—pushed 
the boundaries of permissible testing-the-waters conduct during preliminary 
stages of the 2016 presidential election.  Part II then analyzes the legality of 
such testing-the-waters candidates’ involvement with Super PACs through 
the lens of Advisory Opinion 2015-09.  Lastly, Part II examines the effects 
of the deadlocked Advisory Opinion 2015-09.  Part III discusses whether 
further regulation should be adopted.  Finally, Part IV argues that such 
regulation is necessary and proposes several new regulations. 
I.  AN OVERVIEW OF SUPER PACS AND BECOMING A CANDIDATE 
Before discussing the legality of noncandidates’ coordination with Super 
PACs, it is first important to understand how Super PACs came to be, how 
they function, and the regulations governing when an individual becomes a 
candidate.  Part I.A gives an overview of Super PACs, focusing on the 
Supreme Court holdings that led to their emergence.  Part I.B then discusses 
the current laws and regulations governing Super PACs.  Finally, Part I.C 
explores the regulations and FEC guidance regarding how an individual 
becomes a candidate. 
A.  The Origin of Super PACs 
A Super PAC is an FEC-registered political action committee that makes 
only independent expenditures—that is, expenditures in support or 
opposition of a candidate which are not coordinated with that candidate25—
not contributions.26  The origin of Super PACs begins with Buckley v. 
Valeo,27 where the Supreme Court first made this important distinction 
between independent expenditures and contributions.28  Deeply rooted in 
this distinction is the tension at the heart of campaign finance regulation:  
protecting the First Amendment right of free speech and preventing 
corruption.29  In Buckley, the Court held that contributions, including both 
direct contributions and coordinated expenditures, may be limited because 
they give rise to the danger of quid pro quo corruption and the appearance 
of corruption.30  Conversely, the Buckley Court, under a strict scrutiny 
standard of review, struck down limits on independent expenditures.31  The 
Court reasoned that such expenditures do not present this same danger of 
corruption, and, thus, the restrictions were an unconstitutional burden on the 
First Amendment.32 
 
 25. See 2 U.S.C. § 431(17) (transferred to 52 U.S.C.A. § 30101(17)); Briffault, supra 
note 8, at 1651. 
 26. Briffault, supra note 8, at 1651. 
 27. 424 U.S. 1 (1976). 
 28. Briffault, supra note 8, at 1651. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 46. 
 31. Id. at 45–46, 75. 
 32. Id. 
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Buckley laid the groundwork for the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Citizens United v. FEC.33  In holding corporations may make unlimited 
independent expenditures,34 the Court made two important 
determinations.35  First, the Court clarified the type of corruption sufficient 
to justify First Amendment limitations, holding that preventing quid pro 
quo corruption or the appearance of quid pro quo corruption was the only 
legitimate justification for campaign finance limits.36  The Court explicitly 
overruled two prior cases because the decisions were, in part, based on 
other corruption justifications37:  Austin v. Michigan Chamber of 
Commerce,38 where the Court upheld limits on corporate expenditures 
because of the “the corrosive and distorting effects of immense 
aggregations of wealth that are accumulated with the help of the corporate 
form,”39 later termed the “antidistortion rationale,”40 and McConnell v. 
FEC,41 where the Court upheld a soft-money ban reasoning that soft-money 
donations were likely to give donors preferential access to officeholders.42 
The second important determination the Court made in Citizens United 
was ruling that independent expenditures categorically do not give rise to 
quid pro quo corruption or the appearance thereof.43  The Court reasoned 
that “[t]he absence of prearrangement and coordination of an expenditure 
with the candidate . . . not only undermines the value of the expenditure to 
the candidate, but also alleviates the danger that expenditures will be given 
as a quid pro quo for improper commitments from the candidate.”44  By 
holding that independent expenditures are impervious to corruption, the 
Court laid the groundwork for independent expenditure-only committees to 
emerge, as this holding opened the door for PACs to spend unlimited funds 
on independent expenditures.45 
Although the Citizens United Court held that independent expenditures 
were incorruptible, the Court did not address one question that was 
necessary to answer before the modern-day Super PAC could emerge:  
 
 33. 558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
 34. Id. at 365. 
 35. Id. at 357, 359. 
 36. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 359–61.  The Court later reaffirmed this holding in 
McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1450 (2014) (“[W]hile preventing corruption or its 
appearance is a legitimate objective, Congress may target only a specific type of 
corruption—‘quid pro quo’ corruption.”). 
 37. See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 349–55, 360. 
 38. 494 U.S. 652 (1990), overruled by Citizens United, 558 U.S. 310. 
 39. Id. at 660. 
 40. See Citizens United, 588 U.S. at 313. 
 41. 540 U.S. 93 (2003), overruled by Citizens United, 558 U.S. 310. 
 42. Id. at 156. 
 43. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 357.  The Court offered the 100,000-page record in 
McConnell v. FEC as evidence, stating that the lack of examples of votes being exchanged 
for expenditures in McConnell “confirms Buckley’s reasoning that independent expenditures 
do not lead to, or create the appearance of, quid pro quo corruption.” Id. at 360. 
 44. Id. at 357 (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 47 (1976)). 
 45. See Note, Working Together for an Independent Expenditure:  Candidate Assistance 
with Super Pac Fundraising, 128 HARV. L. REV. 1478, 1482 (2015) [hereinafter Working 
Together]. 
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whether limits could be placed on contributions to independent expenditure-
only groups.  Within just a few months of Citizens United, the D.C. Circuit 
answered this question in SpeechNow.org v. FEC,46 laying the final brick 
necessary for the formation of the modern-day Super PAC.  Relying on the 
Citizens United holding that independent expenditures are impervious to 
corruption, the D.C. Circuit held that “the government can have no anti-
corruption interest in limiting contributions to independent expenditure-
only organizations,” and, thus, any limitations on such contributions were 
unconstitutional.47  Although the FEC did not appeal SpeechNow.org, nor 
has the Supreme Court otherwise specifically addressed contributions to 
independent expenditure-only committees, the holding in SpeechNow.org 
has been widely accepted and adopted.48 
B.  Regulating the Modern-Day Super PAC 
Super PACs are unique from other forms of PACs in both their abilities 
and limitations.  Part I.B.1 gives an overview of the benefits of forming a 
Super PAC, as compared to other PACs.  Part I.B.2 then discusses the 
restrictions placed on Super PACs. 
1.  Why So Super?:  The Inapplicable Regulations 
Under the Federal Election Campaign Act of 197149 (FECA), Super 
PACs are subject to the same federal organizational, registration, reporting, 
and disclosure requirements that apply to other PACs.50  However, because 
Super PACs only make independent expenditures, they are not subject to 
FECA’s $5000 contribution limit.51  That said, any PAC can engage in 
unlimited independent spending, as non-Super PACs can make both 
contributions and independent expenditures.52  However, PACs that make 
contributions—that is, non-Super PACs—can only engage in unlimited 
independent spending with funds raised in compliance with FECA and FEC 
regulations, which prohibit non-Super PACs from raising funds from 
corporations and labor organizations53 and receiving donations from 
individuals in excess of $5000 a year.54  On the other hand, pursuant to 
 
 46. 599 F.3d 686 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 
 47. Id. at 696. 
 48. Bradley A. Smith, Super Pacs and the Role of “Coordination” in Campaign Finance 
Law, 49 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 603, 604 (2013); see N.Y. Progress & Prot. PAC v. Walsh, 
733 F.3d 483, 487 (2d Cir. 2013); Texans for Free Enter. v. Tx. Ethics Comm’n, 732 F.3d 
535, 538 (5th Cir. 2013); Wis. Right to Life State Political Action Comm. v. Barland, 664 
F.3d 139, 155 (7th Cir. 2011); Long Beach Area Chamber of Commerce v. City of Long 
Beach, 603 F.3d 684, 699 (9th Cir. 2010). 
 49. Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 (1972). 
 50. Briffault, supra note 8, at 1646; see 2 U.S.C. §§ 432, 433, 434 (2012) (transferred to 
52 U.S.C.A. §§ 30102, 30103, 30104 (West 2015)); 11 C.F.R. § 104.4 (2015). 
 51. See 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(2)(A) (transferred to 52 U.S.C.A. § 30116(a)(2)(A)). 
 52. Briffault, supra note 8, at 1647. 
 53. 11 C.F.R. § 114.2(b). 
 54. 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(1)(C) (transferred to 52 U.S.C.A. § 30116(a)(1)(C)).  There is 
one exception to the rule that non-Super PACs can only spend funds raised within the 
contribution constraints of FECA and FEC regulations, however.  A Hybrid PAC, created 
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Citizens United and SpeechNow.org, Super PACs can engage in unlimited 
independent spending with funds raised from individuals, corporations, and 
labor organizations that are not subject to contribution dollar restrictions.55 
2.  Restricting Super PACs:  
Coordination and the Independent-Only Requirement 
Although Super PACs are seemingly given wide latitude to raise and 
spend funds, these independent expenditure-only committees have one 
obvious limitation:  they can make only independent expenditures.56  An 
independent expenditure is defined as an expenditure “expressly 
advocating[57] the election or defeat of a clearly identified 
candidate[58] . . . that is not made in concert or cooperation with or at the 
request or suggestion of such candidate, the candidate’s authorized political 
committee, or their agents,”59 or in other words, is not coordinated with 
such candidate.60  Super PACs’ existence hinges on this coordination 
restriction—that is, the independence of an independent expenditure.61 
The FEC promulgated a three-prong test for determining whether an 
expenditure is coordinated, which consists of the payment, content, and 
conduct prongs.62  The payment prong is satisfied if the communication 
“[i]s paid for, in whole or in part, by a person other than that candidate, 
authorized committee, or political party committee.”63  The content prong is 
satisfied if the communication is one of the types of communications listed 
 
after Carey v. FEC, 791 F. Supp. 2d 121 (D.D.C. 2011), may raise unlimited sums from 
individuals, corporations, and labor organizations for independent expenditures, like a Super 
PAC, and raise funds subject to the FECA and FEC regulation limitations for contributions, 
if it meets certain requirements, such as maintaining separate bank accounts. 11 C.F.R. 
§ 114.10(a); Dave Levinthal, Hybrid PACs Generating Few Greenbacks, CTR. FOR PUB. 
INTEGRITY (Feb. 2, 2015, 2:07 PM), http://www.publicintegrity.org/2015/02/01/16682/ 
hybrid-pacs-generating-few-greenbacks [https://perma.cc/94G7-7UV8]. 
 55. See supra Part I.A. 
 56. Briffault, supra note 8, at 1647. 
 57. Express advocacy includes any communication that 
[w]hen taken as a whole . . . could only be interpreted by a reasonable person as 
containing advocacy of the election or defeat of one or more clearly identified 
candidate(s) because— 
(1) The electoral portion of the communication is unmistakable, 
unambiguous, and suggestive of only one meaning; and 
(2) Reasonable minds could not differ as to whether it encourages actions to 
elect or defeat one or more clearly identified candidate(s) or encourages 
some other kind of action. 
11 C.F.R. § 100.22.  For examples of communications containing express advocacy, see id. 
 58. “Clearly identified” means the candidate’s name, nickname, photograph, or drawing 
appears, or the identity of the candidate is otherwise apparent through an unambiguous 
reference. 2 U.S.C § 431(18) (transferred to 52 U.S.C.A. § 30101(18)); 11 C.F.R. § 100.17.  
For examples of references to a clearly identified candidate, see 11 C.F.R. § 100.17. 
 59. 2 U.S.C. § 431(17) (transferred to 52 U.S.C.A. § 30101(17)); see also 11 C.F.R. 
§ 100.16. 
 60. See 11 C.F.R. § 109.20(a) (defining coordinated). 
 61. See Stop This Insanity, Inc. Emp. Leadership Fund v. FEC, 902 F. Supp. 2d 23, 38 
(D.D.C. 2012); Smith, supra note 48, at 604– 05; Working Together, supra note 45, at 1483. 
 62. See 11 C.F.R. § 109.21(a). 
 63. Id. § 109.21(a)(1). 
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in the regulation.64  The conduct prong is the most relevant part of the test, 
as it deals with the actual interactions between candidates and Super PACs.  
The conduct prong is satisfied if:  (1) the communication is created at the 
request or suggestion of the candidate or at the suggestion of a person 
paying for the communication and the candidate assents to the suggestion;65 
(2) the candidate is materially involved in decision making for the 
communication;66 (3) the communication is created after one or more 
substantial discussions about the communication between the person or 
organization paying for the communication and the candidate;67 (4) the 
person or organization paying for the communication contracts with a 
commercial vendor to produce or distribute the communication that 
provided certain services to the candidate during the previous 120 days;68 or 
(5) the communication is paid for by a person or by the employer of a 
person who was an employee or independent contractor of the candidate 
during the previous 120 days.69  The FEC specifies that neither agreement 
nor formal collaboration is required for a communication to be 
coordinated.70 
A coordinated expenditure is treated as a contribution to the candidate.71  
Thus, a Super PAC could face severe consequences if it made a coordinated 
expenditure.  As the Super PAC would no longer be making only 
independent expenditures, it would lose its ability to operate as a Super 
 
 64. See id. § 109.21(c).  These include electioneering communications, see id. § 100.29 
for the definition, and certain public communications that are listed in id. § 109.21(c)(2)–(5). 
 65. Id. § 109.21(d)(1). 
 66. Id. § 109.21(d)(2).  Material involvement includes playing a part in decisions 
regarding the content, intended audience, means or mode, the media outlet, the timing or 
frequency, the size of printed communications, or the duration of broadcast communications. 
Id. 
 67. Id. § 109.21(d)(3).  A discussion is substantial if information about the candidate’s 
campaign plans, projects, activities, or needs is conveyed to the person or group paying for 
the communication and that information is material to the creation, production, or 
distribution of the communication. Id. 
 68. Id. § 109.21(d)(4).  These services include developing a media strategy or the 
content of the public communication; selecting audiences; polling; fundraising; producing a 
public communication; identifying voters or creating voter lists, mailing lists, or donor lists; 
selecting personnel, contractors, or subcontractors; and consulting or otherwise providing 
political or media advice. Id. 
 69. Id. § 109.21(d)(5). 
 70. Id. § 109.21(e).  Additionally, the FEC also included several safe harbor provisions:  
candidates may respond to inquiries about legislative or policy issues; the person or group 
paying for the communication may use publicly available information to create the 
communication; candidates may endorse or solicit funds for other candidates, political 
committees, or other organizations; candidates may appear in a public communication in 
which he or she is clearly identified as the owner or operator of a business that existed prior 
to candidacy; and none of the conduct standards are satisfied if the vendor, political 
committee, former employee, or contractor implements a firewall. Id. §§ 109.21(d)(2)–(5), 
(f), (g), (h).  However, the firewall safe harbor does not apply if, despite the firewall, the 
circumstances indicate that the person paying for the communication used or was conveyed 
information about the candidate’s campaign plans, projects, activities, or needs and such 
information was material to the creation, production, or distribution of that communication. 
Id. § 109.21(h). 
 71. 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(7)(B)(i) (2012) (transferred to 52 U.S.C.A. § 30116(a)(7)(B)(i) 
(West 2015)). 
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PAC,72 thus triggering the FECA contribution regulations placed on non-
Super PACs.73  Additionally, if the contribution (in this case, the 
coordinated expenditure) cost more than $5000 or was paid for with funds 
raised from corporations or labor unions, the contribution would be 
unlawful, as it would contravene FECA’s contribution restrictions.74 
C.  Testing the Waters or Triggering Candidacy:  
Determining When an Individual Becomes a Candidate 
Before exploring how these Super PAC limits interact with testing-the-
waters candidates, it is important to determine how an individual becomes a 
candidate.  However, the answer to this question is not as cut-and-dried as it 
may seem.  Part I.C.1 gives a basic overview of the laws and regulations 
governing testing-the-waters candidates’ transition into candidacy.  Part 
I.C.2 then discusses how the FEC, through advisory opinions and matters 
under review, has attempted to provide guidance on the enforcement of 
these laws and regulations. 
1.  Statutes and Regulations 
According to FECA and FEC regulations, a candidate is an individual 
who, in seeking election to federal office, receives contributions or makes 
expenditures—or consents to another person doing so on their behalf—
aggregating in excess of $5000.75  However, the FEC created an exemption 
to this $5000 aggregate threshold for contributions and expenditures spent 
“for the purpose of determining whether an individual should become a 
candidate,” known as the testing-the-waters exemption.76  That said, this 
exemption does not apply to payments made or received “for activities 
indicating that an individual has decided to become a candidate for a 
particular office or for activities relevant to conducting a campaign.”77  
Once candidacy is triggered, the individual must file a statement of 
candidacy with the FEC within fifteen days, and all funds or payments 
exempt during the testing-the-waters phase are treated as contributions or 
expenditures and must be reported.78  On the other hand, while in the 
testing-the-waters phase, individuals do not have to register with the FEC, 
 
 72. Smith, supra note 48, at 605. 
 73. See supra Part I.B.2. 
 74. See supra notes 51–53 and accompanying text (explaining that contributions may 
not be made in excess of $5000 or from funds raised from corporations or labor unions); 2 
U.S.C. § 441a(f) (transferred to 52 U.S.C.A. § 30116(f)) (“No candidate or political 
committee shall knowingly accept any contribution or make any expenditure in violation of 
the provisions of this section . . . .”); see also Working Together, supra note 45, at 1483 
(“Because certain actors, such as corporations and labor organizations, cannot contribute 
money directly to federal candidates, a Super PAC’s contribution to a candidate would be 
illegal if the Super PAC had raised any of its funds from those prohibited sources.”). 
 75. 2 U.S.C. § 431(2) (transferred to 52 U.S.C.A. § 30101(2)); 11 C.F.R. § 100.3. 
 76. 11 C.F.R. §§ 100.72, 100.131. 
 77. Id. 
 78. See 2 U.S.C. §§ 432(e), 433 (transferred to 52 U.S.C.A. §§ 30102(e), 30103); 11 
C.F.R. §§ 101.1, 101.3, 100.72, 100.131. 
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create an exploratory committee, or file disclosure reports, but may if they 
so choose.79 
2.  FEC Clarification or Confusion? 
The FEC created the testing-the-waters exemption to afford individuals 
the opportunity to determine whether there is enough political support for a 
candidacy.80  These regulations seek to draw a distinction between activities 
directed at evaluating one’s candidacy and those merely confirming a 
private decision to become a candidate that has already been made.81  An 
individual, who has raised or spent more than $5000, becomes a candidate 
when he or she makes a private determination to run for federal office.82  
However, the FEC looks objectively at an individual’s activities in 
determining whether this decision has been made, not to that individual’s 
subjective decision-making process.83  This section explores how the FEC 
conducts this objective analysis.  Part I.C.2.a discusses how the FEC has 
expanded permissible testing-the-waters activities.  Part I.C.2.b analyzes 
how the FEC has attempted to provide guidance on the type of conduct that 
triggers candidacy. 
a.  Permissible Testing-the-Waters Activities 
FEC regulations provide a nonexhaustive list of permissible testing-the-
waters activities, which includes conducting polls, telephone calls, and 
travel.84  Through advisory opinions and matters under review, the FEC has 
clarified and expanded what constitutes a permissible testing-the-waters 
activity. 
In Advisory Opinion 1981-32, the FEC found that none of the fourteen 
testing-the-waters activities proposed by the requestor, former Governor 
Reubin Askew, would trigger candidacy.85  The FEC further clarified 
permissible testing-the-waters “travel” by approving Askew’s plans to 
travel throughout the country to speak to groups about public issues and 
attend briefings, as well as employ an assistant to help coordinate these 
travel arrangements.86  The FEC also clarified the conducting polls 
exemption by approving Askew’s plans to employ a “specialist in opinion 
research to conduct [his] polls.”87 
 
 79. See 11 C.F.R. §§ 101.3, 100.72, 100.131; FEC Matter Under Review 6819 (Krulick 
for Congress), Factual and Legal Analysis, at 6 n.7 (Feb. 25, 2015) [hereinafter MUR 6819], 
http://eqs.fec.gov/eqsdocsMUR/15044371517.pdf [https://perma.cc/89Y2-95PD]. 
 80. FEC Advisory Opinion 1981-32 (Askew), at 4 (Oct. 2, 1981) [hereinafter AO 1981-
32], http://saos.fec.gov/aodocs/1981-32.pdf [https://perma.cc/WUE3-USZ5]. 
 81. Id. 
 82. AO 2015-09, supra note 23, at 5. 
 83. FEC Matter Under Review 5363 (Sharpton), Factual and Legal Analysis, at 7–8 
(Nov. 13, 2003) [hereinafter MUR 5363], http://eqs.fec.gov/eqsdocsMUR/000007F9.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/5LHB-AVRX]. 
 84. 11 C.F.R. §§ 100.72, 100.131. 
 85. AO 1981-32, supra note 80, at 4. 
 86. Id. at 2–3. 
 87. Id. at 3. 
1702 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 84 
Additionally, the FEC approved several more of Askew’s plans, 
expanding permissible testing-the-waters activities to include:  employing 
political and public relations consultants; renting office space and 
equipment; preparing and using letterhead stationery to correspond with 
persons who displayed an interest in Askew’s potential campaign; 
supplementing the salary of a personal secretary for additional 
responsibility incurred during the testing-the-waters period; reimbursing the 
Governor’s law firm for the activities of an associate attorney employed by 
the firm who would have additional responsibility during the testing-the-
waters period; reimbursing the Governor’s law firm for telephone costs, 
copying costs, and other incidental expenses; preparing and printing a 
biographical brochure and possibly photographs for use in connection with 
speaking appearances (not for the general public); and soliciting 
contributions for the limited purpose of engaging in such testing-the-waters 
activities (not for the future campaign).88  Although this seemed to expand 
dramatically permissible testing-the-waters activities, the FEC did warn 
Askew that these activities must be solely for the purpose of determining 
whether candidacy was viable.89 
In Advisory Opinion 1982-03, the FEC again classified several activities 
as falling within the testing-the-waters exemptions.  Here, the FEC 
approved Senator Alan Cranston’s plans to travel and speak to groups about 
public issues, to hire “independent contractors in such fields as polling, 
political consulting, public opinion, communications[,] or research,” to 
compile and maintain information concerning persons who indicate interest 
in Senator Cranston’s possible candidacy, and to organize advisory groups 
on issues requiring expertise.90 
Similarly, in Advisory Opinion 1985-40, the FEC ruled that a testing-the-
waters fund established by former U.S. Senator Howard Baker Jr. could 
send direct mail solicitations, as long as the mailings clearly indicated that 
Baker had not yet determined whether he would seek the presidential 
nomination, the funds raised would only be used for the purpose of testing-
the-waters activities, and the solicitations did not result in amassing 
campaign funds for use during candidacy.91 
b.  Triggering Candidate Status 
FEC regulations provide the following nonexhaustive list as examples of 
activities that indicate an individual has decided to become a candidate: 
(1)  The individual uses general public political advertising to publicize 
his or her intention to campaign for Federal office.  (2)  The individual 
raises funds in excess of what could reasonably be expected to be used for 
 
 88. Id. at 2–3. 
 89. Id. at 4–5. 
 90. FEC Advisory Opinion 1982-03 (Cranston), at 2, 4 (Mar. 15, 1982), http://saos.fec. 
gov/aodocs/1982-03.pdf [https://perma.cc/P784-UQX3]. 
 91. FEC Advisory Opinion 1985-40 (Republican Majority Fund), at 4 (Jan. 24, 1986) 
[hereinafter AO 1985-40], http://saos.fec.gov/aodocs/1985-40.pdf [https://perma.cc/8XTX-
AUAH]. 
2016] LIMITING PRE-CANDIDACY COORDINATION 1703 
exploratory activities or undertakes activities designed to amass campaign 
funds that would be spent after he or she becomes a candidate.  (3)  The 
individual makes or authorizes written or oral statements that refer to him 
or her as a candidate for a particular office.  (4)  The individual conducts 
activities in close proximity to the election or over a protracted period of 
time.  (5)  The individual has taken action to qualify for the ballot under 
State law.92 
The listed activities do not technically, in and of themselves, trigger 
candidate status, but rather are tools used by the FEC to objectively analyze 
whether an individual has decided to run for office.93  Even if the FEC 
determines that such a decision has been made, candidate status is only 
triggered if the individual has satisfied the $5000 contribution and 
expenditure threshold.94 
The first candidacy-triggering activity concerns general public political 
advertising.95  This type of advertising “includes communications by 
broadcast, satellite or cable, newspaper, magazine, outdoor advertising 
facility, mass mailings, phone banks, and Internet communications.”96  In 
Matter Under Review 6224, the FEC found that appearing at a cocktail 
reception of a prominent businessman the day after the Republican state 
convention and meeting with farmers and ranchers did not constitute 
general public political advertising.97 
The second candidacy-triggering activity concerns raising excessive 
funds and amassing funds for use during candidacy.98  The FEC has never 
ruled that an amount was in excess of what could reasonably be expected to 
test the waters.  In Matter Under Review 5934, the FEC ruled that raising 
 
 92. 11 C.F.R. §§ 100.72, 100.131 (2015). 
 93. E.g., FEC Matter Under Review 6449 (Bruning et al.), Factual and Legal Analysis, 
at 6 (2013) [hereinafter MUR 6449], http://eqs.fec.gov/eqsdocsMUR/13044331943.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/AKJ7-VDDA]. 
 94. FEC Matter Under Review 6650 (Citizens to Elect Soren Simonsen et al.), Factual 
and Legal Analysis, at 3 (July 3, 2014), http://eqs.fec.gov/eqsdocsMUR/14044361946.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/YQ48-J7BX]; see also FEC Matter Under Review 6736 (Art Halvorson et 
al.), Factual and Legal Analysis, at 3 (Jan. 16, 2015), http://eqs.fec.gov/eqsdocsMUR/ 
15044370777.pdf (ruling that even though Halverson, the subject of the review, had engaged 
in activities that exceeded the scope of those permitted under the testing-the-waters 
exemption, he had not received contributions or made expenditures in excess of $5000 and, 
thus, had not triggered candidate status) [https://perma.cc/PHD9-DNW5]; MUR 6819, supra 
note 79, at 7 (ruling that Krulick, the subject of the review, did not trigger candidate status 
through certain Facebook posts indicating he had already decided to run because he had not 
yet reached the $5000 threshold).  Even a voluntary filing of a statement of candidacy does 
not trigger candidate status unless this $5000 threshold is met. 11 C.F.R. § 104.1. 
 95. See supra note 92 and accompanying text. 
 96. FEC Matter Under Review 6224 (Fiorina), Factual and Legal Analysis, at 9 (July 14, 
2010) [hereinafter MUR 6224] (citing 2 U.S.C § 431(22) (2012) (transferred to 52 U.S.C.A. 
§ 30101(22) (West 2015))), http://eqs.fec.gov/eqsdocsMUR/10044274140.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/T4EX-WYDT]; accord 11 C.F.R. § 100.26. 
 97. MUR 6224, supra note 96, at 8–9.  The FEC did note, however, that the lack of 
evidence demonstrating that the subject of the review actually announced her intention to run 
for the U.S. Senate and that the events were publicized through general public political 
advertising were factors in their analysis. Id. at 9–10. 
 98. See supra note 92 and accompanying text. 
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funds as high as $9,528,494 for testing the waters was not unreasonable.99  
Additionally, in this matter, the First General Counsel’s Report suggested 
that raising $9,528,494, but only spending $2,923,607, was indicative of 
amassing campaign funds for candidacy; however, the FEC failed to rule as 
such.100  In Matter Under Review 6224, the FEC ruled that hiring 
consultants and low-level staffers to sell T-shirts and hats at a party 
convention and collecting online donations was insufficient to demonstrate 
amassing funds for eventual candidacy.101  In making this determination, 
the FEC emphasized that the complainant failed to demonstrate that these 
actions were for purposes other than testing the waters.102  On the other 
hand, the FEC has ruled that soliciting funds for use against a specifically 
named opponent does indicate the individual is amassing funds 
impermissibly for candidacy.103 
The third candidacy-triggering activity concerns “written or oral 
statements that refer to [the individual] as a candidate for a particular 
office.”104  For example, the FEC ruled that the Reverend Al Sharpton 
became a candidate when, in chapter one of his book entitled “Mr. 
President,” he wrote, among other things, “I am seeking the Presidency of 
the United States in 2004.”105  Other phrases that have been found to trigger 
candidate status include:  “Would you help me serve you . . . as I now seek 
the U.S. Senate?”;106 “‘I’m ready to run’ and ‘I can’t imagine any 
 
 99. Compare FEC Matter Under Review 5934 (Thompson), First General Counsel’s 
Report, at 5 (Oct. 14, 2008) [hereinafter MUR 5934 First General Counsel’s Report], 
http://eqs.fec.gov/eqsdocsMUR/10044272108.pdf (recommending that Senator Thompson 
violated the law by raising excessive funds) [https://perma.cc/KF6S-N62H], with FEC 
Matter Under Review 5934 (Thompson), Statement of Reasons, at 3 (Mar. 10, 2009) 
[hereinafter MUR 5934 Statement of Reasons], http://eqs.fec.gov/eqsdocsMUR/ 
29044230161.pdf (dismissing the complaint) [https://perma.cc/4C75-Y3LS].  The FEC has 
ruled other large sums were insufficient to move beyond what could reasonably be expected 
for exploratory activities. See MUR 6224, supra note 96, at 6 (finding $611,799.25 was not 
unreasonable). 
 100. Compare MUR 5934 First General Counsel’s Report, supra note 99, at 5 (suggesting 
that raising $9,528,494, but only spending $2,923,607 was indicative of amassing funds for 
candidacy), with MUR 5934 Statement of Reasons, supra note 99, at 3 (dismissing the 
complaint). 
 101. MUR 6224, supra note 96, at 6–7. 
 102. Id. at 7. 
 103. See MUR 6449, supra note 93, at 8 (finding Jon Bruning became a candidate by 
sending an email soliciting funds to “defeat Ben Nelson in 2012”); FEC Matter Under 
Review 5693 (Aronsohn et al.), General Counsel’s Report #2, at 9 (Nov. 7, 2007) 
[hereinafter MUR 5693], http://eqs.fec.gov/eqsdocsMUR/28044205053.pdf (finding Paul 
Aronsohn became a candidate by sending a solicitation letter stating every dollar received 
could help “prepare for this fight against [incumbent] Scott Garrett”) 
[https://perma.cc/WZT8-LHYL]. 
 104. See supra note 92 and accompanying text. 
 105. MUR 5363, supra note 83, at 4 (quoting AL SHARPTON & KAREN HUNTER, AL ON 
AMERICA 4, 7 (Kensington 2002)). 
 106. FEC Matter Under Review 6735 (Sestak et al.), Factual and Legal Analysis, at 7 
(July 18, 2014) (quoting Email from Joe Sestak (Aug. 27, 1013)), http://eqs.fec.gov/ 
eqsdocsMUR/14044364180.pdf [https://perma.cc/C7WW-E6GZ]. 
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conditions under which I would not run’”;107 and “[I am] ready to begin 
fighting for our future . . . now. . . .  [I] will immediately work for the 
benefit of Colorado.”108  Additionally, if an individual or his advisors 
inform the media that the individual will announce candidacy on a certain 
date in the future, candidacy is triggered immediately, not on the official 
announcement date.109  Lastly, once candidacy is triggered, subsequent 
attempts to retract statements do not destroy candidate status.110 
However, not every statement that refers to the individual as a candidate 
triggers candidate status.  The FEC generally analyzes the context in which 
each statement was made.  A statement that triggers candidate status 
“requires some objective deliberateness, not a mere ‘slip up.’”111  
Additionally, any statements must be authorized, as unauthorized 
statements by the media that refer to an individual as a candidate are not 
dispositive.112  Moreover, a statement’s audience and purpose are also 
relevant.  In Matter Under Review 6776, the FEC dismissed allegations 
against a testing-the-waters candidate who created a proposal that referred 
to him as a candidate several times, reasoning that the proposal was 
“privately presented” to the National Republican Congressional Committee 
to obtain their view on the feasibility of his candidacy.113 
In addition to context, the FEC also analyzes the content of statements, 
determining whether any statements at issue unambiguously refer to the 
individual as a candidate.114  In Matter Under Review 5934, the FEC 
examined several statements made by Senator Fred Thompson:  “‘[I do not] 
have any big announcement tonight,’ but ‘I plan on seeing a whole lot more 
of you, how ‘bout that?’”;115 “‘[I am] testing the waters’ and ‘the waters 
feel pretty warm to me’”; “[y]ou’re either running or not running . . . I think 
the steps we’ve taken are pretty obvious”;116 and “‘[w]e are going to be 
 
 107. MUR 6449, supra note 93, at 7 (quoting Don Walton, Bruning Says He’s Actively 
Exploring a Senate Campaign, LINCOLN J. STAR, (Nov. 5, 2010), http://journalstar.com/ 
news/local/govt-and-politics/bruning-says-he-s-actively-exploring-a-senate-
campaign/article_88d3c204-e8f9-11df-805c-001cc4c002e0.html [https://perma.cc/A66E-
8Y7E]). 
 108. MUR 5693, supra note 103, at 8–9 (omission in original) (emphasis added). 
 109. AO 2015-09, supra note 23, at 6–7. 
 110. Id. 
 111. FEC Matter Under Review 5672 (Davis et al.) & 5733 (Davis et al.), Statement of 
Reasons, at 3 (Mar. 13, 2007), http://eqs.fec.gov/eqsdocsMUR/00005C4A.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/RVW7-JCCC]. 
 112. MUR 6224, supra note 96, at 10. 
 113. FEC Matter Under Review 6776 (Niger Innis et al.), Factual and Legal Analysis, at 
10 (Dec. 19, 2014), http://eqs.fec.gov/eqsdocsMUR/15044370340.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
6A7V-HR99]. 
 114. See MUR 5934 Statement of Reasons, supra note 99, at 2–3. 
 115. MUR 5934 First General Counsel’s Report, supra note 99, at 7 (quoting Michael 
Shear, Thompson Moves from ‘If’ He’ll Run to ‘How’, WASH. POST (July 2, 2007), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/07/01/AR2007070101 
238.html [https://perma.cc/N9QR-65G9]). 
 116. MUR 5934 Statement of Reasons, supra note 99, at 2 (quoting Erik Schelzig, Fred 
Thompson Defends His Lobbying Past, WASH. POST (June 26, 2007, 5:41 PM), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/06/26/AR2007062601055_pf. 
html [https://perma.cc/N3YZ-ULCQ]). 
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getting in if we get in, and of course, we are in the testing the waters phase,’ 
adding, ‘we’re going to be making a statement shortly that will cure all of 
that.’”117  The FEC found that although Senator Thompson “tested the 
boundaries of the testing the waters exemption,”118 he did not trigger 
candidate status because, unlike Al Sharpton, as discussed in Matter Under 
Review 5363,119 Senator Thompson’s statements were ambiguous.120 
Although according to FEC regulations, testing-the-waters activities 
conducted in close proximity to an election or over a protracted period of 
time may indicate the individual has decided to become a candidate, the 
FEC has since weakened this provision’s determinativeness.  The FEC has 
explained that this factor is relevant,121 but that there is no maximum length 
of time that automatically triggers candidate status.122 
II.  TESTING THE WATERS OR PREPARING FOR CANDIDACY?:  
ANALYZING THE LEGALITY OF PRE-CANDIDACY COORDINATION 
Despite the FEC’s attempts to clarify when candidacy is triggered 
through regulations, advisory opinions, and matters under review,123 when 
an individual becomes a candidate remains largely uncertain.  Adding to 
this ambiguity, it is also unclear how restrictions regulating Super PACs, all 
of which refer only to a “candidate,”124 correlate with testing-the-waters 
candidates.  Part II.A discusses how, during the early stages of the 2016 
presidential election, individuals used these ambiguities to strategically 
circumvent campaign finance restrictions on coordination.  Part II.B then 
examines the FEC’s analysis of these issues in Advisory Opinion 2015-09 
and the effects of that opinion. 
A.  Pre-Candidacy Coordination in Action:  
Examples from the 2016 Presidential Election 
During the preliminary stages of the 2016 presidential election, several—
then prospective, later official—candidates seemingly exploited the testing-
the-waters phase by strategically avoiding candidate status.  For example, 
on January 6, 2015, two PACs that support Jeb Bush were formed:  Right to 
Rise PAC, a non-Super PAC, and Right to Rise Super PAC, a single-
 
 117. Id. (quoting John King, Thompson:  Roe ‘Bad Law and Bad Medicine’, CNN (Aug. 
17, 2007, 10:53 AM), http://politicalticker.blogs.cnn.com/2007/08/18/thompson-on-running-
we%E2%80%99ll-be-in/comment-page-8/ [https://perma.cc/68KG-GZ9Z]). 
 118. Id. 
 119. See MUR 5363, supra note 83, at 4; supra note 105 and accompanying text. 
 120. MUR 5934 Statement of Reasons, supra note 99, at 2–3. 
 121. See AO 1981-32 supra note 80, at 5 (stating that time period has relevance, as had 
Governor Askew engaged in certain activities over a protracted period of time, the length of 
time would have diminished the activities’ usefulness in testing the waters and suggested 
Governor Askew was trying to build a base of support). 
 122. E.g., AO 2015-09, supra note 23, at 6. 
 123. See supra Part I.C.2. 
 124. See supra Part I.B.2. 
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candidate Super PAC125 (later renamed and subsequently referred to in this 
Note as “Right to Rise USA”).126  Bush did not officially file his statement 
of candidacy with the FEC until June 15, 2015,127 more than six months 
after initially announcing he was “actively explor[ing] the possibility” of 
running for president.128  During this period, Jeb Bush traveled around the 
country, speaking in front of crowds and headlining at least thirty-nine 
Right to Rise USA fundraisers as the event’s “featured guest.”129  By June 
30, 2015—two weeks after Bush officially declared—Right to Rise USA 
had already raised over $103 million.130  Throughout this period, however, 
other than one slip-up, Bush consistently maintained that he had not yet 
made a decision to run.131 
Mike Murphy, a top advisor during Jeb Bush’s 1998 and 2002 
gubernatorial campaigns and someone Bush himself calls “a good 
friend,”132 heads Right to Rise USA.133  On June 17, 2015—two days after 
Bush filed his statement of candidacy—Buzzfeed reporters listened in on a 
call between Murphy and a group of donors, in which Murphy admitted to 
coordinating with the Bush campaign during Bush’s testing-the-waters 
phase.134  Murphy stated he “[couldn’t] coordinate [with Jeb Bush’s 
campaign] any more,” but added he was “well informed as of a week 
ago.”135  Murphy then went on to describe campaign strategy, explaining 
 
 125. Robert Costa, Jeb Bush and His Allies Form Leadership PAC and Super PAC, Both 
Dubbed Right to Rise, WASH. POST (Jan. 6, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/ 
post-politics/wp/2015/01/06/jeb-bush-forms-new-pac-right-to-rise/ [https://perma.cc/CL5F-
6MJ4]. 
 126. See FEC Form 1, Statement of Organization, Right to Rise USA (June 12, 2015), 
http://docquery.fec.gov/pdf/367/15951468367/15951468367.pdf [https://perma.cc/HBE3-
CS6T]. 
 127. FEC Form 2, Statement of Candidacy, Jeb Bush (June 15, 2015), 
http://docquery.fec.gov/pdf/747/15031431747/15031431747.pdf [https://perma.cc/2G7T-
L386]. 
 128. Costa, supra note 125. 
 129. Michael C. Bender, Jeb Bush Tries to Win Without Speaking to His Favorite 
Strategist, BLOOMBERG (June 26, 2015, 6:00 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/politics/ 
articles/2015-06-26/does-anyone-believe-jeb-bush-isn-t-talking-to-his-super-pac-chief- 
[https://perma.cc/U5TW-BC7R]. 
 130. FEC Form 3X, Report of Receipts and Disbursements, Right to Rise USA, at 2 (July 
31, 2015), http://docquery.fec.gov/pdf/819/201507319000471819/201507319000471819.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/E9EB-98N6]. 
 131. Eric Lichtblau & Nick Corasaniti, Jeb Bush, Taking His Time, Tests the Legal 
Definition of Candidate, N.Y. TIMES (June 3, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/04/ 
us/politics/jeb-bush-taking-his-time-tests-the-legal-definition-of-candidate.html?_r=1 
[https://perma.cc/8V4K-MSKF]. 
 132. Bender, supra note 129. 
 133. Ed O’Keefe, Meet the People Who Will Try to Get Jeb Bush Elected President, 
WASH. POST (June 15, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-politics/wp/2015/ 
06/15/a-guide-to-jeb-bushs-family-friends-donors-staff-and-super-pac-friends/ 
[https://perma.cc/324S-8WP7]. 
 134. Andrew Kaczynski & Ilan Ben-Meir, We Crashed Jeb Bush’s Super PAC’s Donor 
Call, and Here’s What They Said, BUZZFEED (June 17, 2015, 6:53 PM), 
http://www.buzzfeed.com/andrewkaczynski/we-crashed-jeb-bushs-super-pacs-donor-call-
and-heres-what-th#.dnNonn24M0 [https://perma.cc/4MAH-66YC]. 
 135. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Mike Murphy). 
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what Bush’s message would focus on as the presidential race continued.136  
Murphy also credited Bush with creating part of the Super PAC’s strategy, 
stating, “[O]ne of the new ideas that, you know, the governor had—he’s 
such an innovator—is we’re going to be the first super PAC to really be 
able to do just positive advertising.”137  Similarly, other sources reported 
that Murphy was “deeply involved in Bush’s steps, courting donors, 
selecting staff[,] and developing strategy.”138 
Bush is not alone in participating in forming a single-candidate Super 
PAC and sharing plans and strategies.  For example, there is evidence that 
John Kasich played a similar role with the Super PAC that supports him, 
New Day for America.  In April of 2015, Kasich helped form a 527 
organization139 called New Day for America.140  Kasich did not file a 
statement of candidacy with the FEC until July 23, 2015.141  That same day, 
the 527 organization registered with the FEC and became a Super PAC.142  
Prior to this split, Kasich reportedly played a significant role in determining 
the Super PAC’s leadership and staff,143 as well as had substantial 
discussions about long-term strategy with those who would go on to work 
for the Super PAC.144  Kasich’s role in creating New Day for America is 
 
 136. Id. (“Murphy said Bush’s message would focus on three things:  how to ‘make this 
country an economic superpower again’; that Bush wants [to] ‘blow up the machine in 
Washington’; and ‘the world is more chaotic than ever, we need an experienced president, 
who’s had the life training to make our country safer, in a world that’s become more 
unstable.’”). 
 137. Id. (quoting Mike Murphy).  However, a spokesperson for Right to Rise USA later 
said Murphy was referring to “Governor Bush’s historical preference for positive 
advertising.” Matea Gold, It’s Bold, but Legal:  How Campaigns and Their Super PAC 
Backers Work Together, WASH. POST (July 6, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
politics/here-are-the-secret-ways-super-pacs-and-campaigns-can-work-together/2015/07/06/ 
bda78210-1539-11e5-89f3-61410da94eb1_story.html [https://perma.cc/TA66-DMK6]. 
 138. Thomas Beaumont, Jeb Bush Prepares to Give Traditional Campaign a Makeover, 
ASSOCIATED PRESS (Apr. 21, 2015, 6:19 PM), http://bigstory.ap.org/article/409837aa09ee 
405493ad64a94b8c2c3d/bush-preparing-delegate-many-campaign-tasks-super-pac 
[https://perma.cc/G3ZD-ZRVQ]. 
 139. A 527 organization is a group formed under section 527 of the Internal Revenue 
Code, which is not registered with the FEC, but can raise and spend unlimited funds, as long 
as such funds are used for issue advocacy rather than express advocacy. See Briffault, supra 
note 8, at 1648; supra note 57 (defining express advocacy). 
 140. Kasich Forms New Political Organization As He Mulls 2016 Run, NBC NEWS (Apr. 
20, 2015, 1:49 PM), http://www.nbcnews.com/politics/2016-election/kasich-forms-new-
political-organization-he-mulls-2016-run-n345001 [https://perma.cc/W439-TADV]. 
 141. FEC Form 2, Statement of Candidacy, John R. Kasich (July 23, 2015), 
http://docquery.fec.gov/pdf/022/201507230300013022/201507230300013022.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/67Y8-QUDZ]. 
 142. FEC Form 1, Statement of Organization, New Day for America (July 23, 2015), 
http://docquery.fec.gov/pdf/003/201507230300013003/201507230300013003.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/DK8E-ZKKD]. 
 143. See Mark Halperin, John Kasich’s Super-PAC Hires Fred Davis As Media 
Strategist, BLOOMBERG (June 9, 2015, 10:00 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/politics/ 
articles/2015-06-10/exclusive-john-kasich-s-super-pac-hires-fred-davis-as-media-strategist 
[https://perma.cc/6DRD-K7MY]. 
 144. See Darrel Rowland, Super-PAC Rules Are Super-Vague, COLUMBUS DISPATCH 
(Oct. 5, 2015, 6:11 AM), http://www.dispatch.com/content/stories/local/2015/10/05/super-
pac-rules-are-super-vague.html [https://perma.cc/W95W-48GF]. 
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further evidenced by a video posted on New Day for America’s website 
shortly after it became a Super PAC and Kasich filed his statement of 
candidacy.  In the video, Kasich alludes to the fact that he helped create the 
Super PAC supporting him by stating “that’s why I’m announcing that we 
created the New Day for America Committee . . . I hope you’ll visit our 
website at NewDayforAmerica.com.”145 
In addition to planning and strategizing, candidates also pushed the 
boundaries of the testing-the-waters exemptions by having the Super PAC 
that supports them film footage of them discussing their achievements and 
qualifications for office during the testing-the-waters phase, for use in 
creating communications after the individuals officially became candidates.  
Filming this type of footage with a Super PAC during candidacy would 
almost certainly be restricted under coordination regulations.146  Jeb Bush, 
Carly Fiorina, John Kasich, and Scott Walker all filmed footage during the 
testing-the-waters phase that was later used by the Super PACs supporting 
them in advertisements after they filed their statements of candidacy.147 
B.  FEC Advisory Opinion 2015-09 
The media has been quick to highlight the actions of these then-
prospective candidates, but did these individuals violate campaign finance 
law?  Jeb Bush and his lawyers maintain that Bush acted in compliance 
with the law.148  Some campaign finance watchdog groups disagree, 
however, and filed complaints with the FEC against several candidates and 
urged the Department of Justice to take action.149  Then, on September 11, 
 
 145. See Complaint Against John R. Kasich Before the FEC, American Democracy Legal 
Fund, at 8 (July 3, 2015) [hereinafter Complaint Against Kasich] (quoting John R. Kasich), 
http://americandemocracy.org/wp-content/uploads/Kasich-FEC-Complaint.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/R9X4-MGDD]; see also New Day for America, It’s Time for a New Day 
for America, VIMEO (Apr. 2015), https://vimeo.com/125411715 [https://perma.cc/GYL6-
XC57]. 
 146. It is highly unlikely that appearing in a communication would not satisfy the conduct 
prong of the coordination regulations.  See supra note 66 and accompanying text; infra note 
280 and accompanying text. 
 147. Seth McLaughlin, Candidates’ Super PAC Footage Tests Spirit of Campaign 
Finance Laws, WASH. TIMES (Sept. 21, 2015), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/ 
2015/sep/21/carly-fiorina-jeb-bush-john-kasich-super-pac-films/?page=allscott 
[https://perma.cc/6BUK-WJV3]; Andrew Perez, Election 2016:  Republican Candidates 
Fiorina, Bush, Walker Filmed Ads with Super PACs Backing Their Campaigns, INT’L BUS. 
TIMES (Sept. 15, 2015, 4:34 PM), http://www.ibtimes.com/election-2016-republican-
candidates-fiorina-bush-walker-filmed-ads-super-pacs-backing-2098050 [https://perma.cc/ 
3C6U-8YMG]. 
 148. See, e.g., Ed O’Keefe, Campaign Finance Watchdogs Push Justice Dept. to 
Investigate Jeb Bush’s PAC, WASH. POST (May 27, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
news/post-politics/wp/2015/05/27/campaign-finance-watchdogs-push-justice-dept-to-
investigate-jeb-bushs-pac/ [https://perma.cc/SGZ9-UD5S]. 
 149. See Complaint Against Jeb Bush Before the FEC, American Democracy Legal Fund 
(Sept. 21, 2015), http://americandemocracy.org/wp-content/uploads/ADLF-Complaint-vs-
Jeb-and-Jeb-Inc..pdf [https://perma.cc/38SR-8AJ7]; Complaint Against Kasich, supra note 
145; Complaint Against Jeb Bush Before the FEC, Campaign Legal Center & Democracy 21 
(Mar. 31, 2015), http://www.campaignlegalcenter.org/sites/default/files/CLC%20% 
20D21%20v.%20Jeb%20Bush_Complaint_3.31.15.pdf [https://perma.cc/4WZR-7CC7]; 
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2015, campaign finance lawyer Marc Elias filed an advisory opinion 
request with the FEC on behalf of Senate Majority PAC (SMP) and House 
Majority PAC (HMP)—two Democratic PACs—in the hopes that the FEC 
would address some of these issues.150  Part II.B.1 gives an overview of the 
questions Elias asked in his advisory opinion request.  Part II.B.2 then 
explores the FEC’s analysis of those questions by examining the different 
draft advisory opinions issued prior to the final vote on the request.  Lastly, 
Part II.B.3 discusses the effect Advisory Opinion 2015-09 has on the 
legality of the conduct described in the advisory opinion request. 
1.  Asking the Right Questions:  
Advisory Opinion Request 2015-09 
In Advisory Opinion Request 2015-09, Elias, on behalf of SMP and 
HMP, asked twelve questions, four of which are relevant to this Note.  
Question 7—by inquiring whether the conduct proposed in Question 1 
would trigger candidacy—asks if candidacy is triggered when “an 
individual, who would not otherwise be a candidate, participates in forming 
a Super PAC (either directly or through agents), whose purpose is to 
support the individual’s prospective candidacy,” once that Super PAC 
raised more than $5000.151  Elias explains that such participation would 
include appointing the Super PAC’s leadership, who would then raise funds 
in unlimited amounts and spend such funds on independent expenditures in 
support of the individual after he or she became a candidate.152 
The other relevant questions concern noncandidates’ ability to coordinate 
with the single-candidate Super PAC that will support them during 
candidacy and how this could affect candidate status: 
Question 2:  If Senate Contender and House Contender, who would not 
otherwise be candidates, share with the New Super PACs, SMP, and 
HMP (either directly or through agents) information about their plans, 
projects, activities, or needs, may the New Super PACs, SMP, and HMP 
use that information to create public communications that satisfy the 
“content prong” under 11 C.F.R. § 109.21 and air after Senate Contender 
and House Contender become candidates?153 
 
Complaint Against Scott Walker Before the FEC, Campaign Legal Center & Democracy 21 
(Mar. 31, 2015), http://www.campaignlegalcenter.org/sites/default/files/CLC%20%20D21% 
20v.%20Scott%20Walker_Complaint_3.31.15.pdf [https://perma.cc/4JFJ-HAF9]. 
 150. See FEC Advisory Opinion Request 2015-09 (Sept. 11, 2015) [hereinafter AOR 
2015-09], http://saos.fec.gov/aodocs/1320488.pdf [https://perma.cc/8Y8N-E4JQ]. 
 151. Id. at 4, 13.  Question 7 is actually phrased in terms of whether the conduct 
described in Question 1 would trigger candidate status. Id. at 13 (“Question 7:  Would the 
activities described in Question 1 trigger candidacy once the New Super PACs had raised 
more than $5,000?”).  Question 1 asks, “If an individual, who would not otherwise be a 
candidate, participates in the formation of a Super PAC (either directly or through agents), 
whose purpose is to support the individual’s prospective candidacy, is the Super PAC barred 
from raising or spending soft money after the individual becomes a candidate?” Id. at 4.  
However, a discussion of Question 1 is beyond the scope of this Note. 
 152. Id. at 5. 
 153. Id. at 6. 
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The advisory opinion request adds further detail, stating that the 
noncandidates will share information about whether the Super PAC should 
sponsor positive or negative advertising and the campaign’s messaging and 
scheduling plans.154  Furthermore, the advisory opinion request clarifies 
this question, asking whether such pre-candidacy behavior would satisfy the 
conduct prong under 11 C.F.R. § 109.21(d).155  Two other questions are 
relevant to this Note: 
Question 3:  May SMP, HMP, and the New Super PACs film footage in a 
studio of Senate Contender and House Contender, who would not then 
otherwise be candidates, discussing their achievements, experiences, and 
qualifications for office, and use that footage in public communications 
that satisfy the “content prong” under 11 C.F.R. § 109.21?156 
Question 10:  Assuming that an individual has raised or spent more than 
$5,000 on “testing-the-waters” activities, would the activity described in 
Question 3 trigger candidacy?157 
In response to the request, the FEC initially released two draft advisory 
opinions—“Draft A” and “Draft B”—the only difference between the two 
being the answer to two questions unrelated to this Note.158  The FEC also 
received a joint comment from two of the watchdog groups that filed 
complaints with the FEC,159 the Campaign Legal Center and Democracy 
21.160  The FEC briefly discussed the advisory opinion request in an open 
meeting on October 29, 2015 (with Elias present), but decided to push off a 
vote until November 10th to allow the FEC time to release more draft 
opinions and for interested parties to comment.161  Between the two 
meetings, the FEC released four more draft opinions—“Draft C,” “Draft 
D,”162 “Draft E,” and “Draft F”—and received comments from Elias (on 
behalf of SMP and HMP)163 and Charles Spies (the lawyer who represents 
 
 154. Id. 
 155. Id.; see supra notes 65–69 and accompanying text. 
 156. AOR 2015-09, supra note 150, at 7. 
 157. Id. at 16. 
 158. Compare Draft A, FEC Advisory Opinion 2015-09, at 25–29 (Oct. 28, 2015), 
http://saos.fec.gov/aodocs/201509.pdf [https://perma.cc/VHY5-WNGU], with Draft B, FEC 
Advisory Opinion 2015-09, at 27–29 (Oct. 28, 2015), http://saos.fec.gov/aodocs/ 
201509_1.pdf [https://perma.cc/XS4U-KKTK]. 
 159. See supra notes 145, 149. 
 160. See Comments from the Campaign Legal Center & Democracy 21, Advisory 
Opinion Request 2015-09 (Oct. 27, 2015) [hereinafter Comments from CLC & Democracy 
21], http://saos.fec.gov/aodocs/1322339.pdf [https://perma.cc/UW9C-VNU7]. 
 161. Transcript of Record, FEC Open Meeting (Oct. 29, 2015) [hereinafter Transcript], 
http://www.fec.gov/agenda/2015/documents/transcripts/Open_Meeting_Captions_2015_10_
29.txt [https://perma.cc/79FP-RP8V]. 
 162. Draft D simply states that the questions are hypothetical, and thus, the FEC cannot 
answer through their advisory opinion powers. See Draft D, FEC Advisory Opinion 2015-09, 
at 7–19 (Nov. 5, 2015), http://saos.fec.gov/aodocs/201509_3.pdf [https://perma.cc/B3NK-
86AJ]. 
 163. See Comments from Marc E. Elias et al., Advisory Opinion Request 2015-09 (Nov. 
9, 2015) [hereinafter Comments from Elias], http://saos.fec.gov/aodocs/1322574.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/SZR9-3WP5]. 
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Right to Rise USA,164 but who was acting on his own behalf).165  Draft C, 
the draft supported by the Republican commissioners,166 and Draft E, the 
draft supported by two of the Democratic commissioners,167 are the two 
drafts most relevant for analyzing the proposed questions.  At the open 
meeting on November 10, 2015, the FEC discussed the draft opinions and 
passed Draft F by unanimous vote.168 
2.  Exploring Legality Under Existing Regulations 
It is first important to establish that there are two different ways in which 
these questions can be examined:  (1) whether the existing coordination 
regulations apply to the interactions between testing-the-waters candidates 
and Super PACs, and (2) whether such interactions trigger candidate status, 
simultaneously making coordination regulations applicable to those 
individuals as candidates.  Through analyzing FEC draft opinions and 
comments by others, Part II.B.2.a examines whether existing coordination 
regulations apply to testing-the-waters candidates, while Part II.B.2.b 
examines whether such behavior is regulated through triggering candidacy.  
Lastly, Part II.B.2.c discusses the jurisdictional issues surrounding the FEC 
regulating noncandidates. 
a.  Unlawful Testing-the-Waters Coordination? 
FEC coordination regulations do not mention individuals who are not 
candidates, testing the waters or otherwise.169  Such regulations define 
coordinated as “made in cooperation, consultation or concert with, or at the 
request or suggestion of, a candidate, a candidate’s authorized committee, 
or a political party committee.”170  Additionally, the conduct prong of the 
coordinated communication regulation171 exclusively refers to conduct 
between the creator of the communication and a candidate or a candidate’s 
authorized committee.172  A plain reading of these regulations could lead to 
the conclusion that such coordination regulations do not apply to 
individuals prior to candidacy.173 
 
 164. See supra note 126 and accompanying text. 
 165. See Comments from Charles R. Spies & James E. Tyrrell III, Advisory Opinions 
Request 2015-09 (Nov. 4, 2015) [hereinafter Comments from Spies & Tyrrell], 
http://saos.fec.gov/aodocs/1322503.pdf [https://perma.cc/J3UT-2GCN]. 
 166. See Certification, FEC Advisory Opinion 2015-09 (SMP and HMP), at 1 (Nov. 10, 
2015) [hereinafter Certification], http://saos.fec.gov/aodocs/1323173.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
C49M-3NJG]. 
 167. See id. at 2. 
 168. See id. at 1. 
 169. 11 C.F.R. §§ 109.20, 109.21 (2015). 
 170. Id. § 109.20(a) (emphasis added).  Furthermore, the regulations governing 
coordinated communications provide “[a] communication is coordinated with a 
candidate . . . when the communication . . . .” Id. § 109.21(a) (emphasis added). 
 171. See supra notes 65–69 and accompanying text. 
 172. See 11 C.F.R. § 109.21(d). 
 173. See Draft C, FEC Advisory Opinion 2015-09, at 5 (Nov. 5, 2015) [hereinafter Draft 
C], http://saos.fec.gov/aodocs/201509_2.pdf [https://perma.cc/GA9Y-CYGB]. 
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Draft C utilizes this same plain meaning analysis in answering Questions 
2 and 3 in the affirmative, finding that the proposed Super PAC may use 
information it receives about an individual’s plans, projects, activities, or 
needs from that individual and may film the individual discussing their 
achievements to create public communications after the individual becomes 
a candidate.174  Draft C asserts that Elias’s inclusion of “an individual, who 
would not otherwise be a candidate,”175 within the questions of Advisory 
Opinion Request 2015-09, establishes that the individual is only 
contemplating candidacy and, thus, cannot be a candidate.176  Draft C 
asserts this despite subsequently receiving a comment from Elias stating 
that such language does not establish that the individual is only 
contemplating candidacy.177  Working based off of this assumption and 
making no mention of the possibility of coordination restrictions applying 
to testing-the-waters activities, Draft C simply states that coordination 
regulations do not apply because the individuals in question are not 
candidates.178 
In his advisory opinion request, Elias makes a different argument, 
asserting that “[t]he regulatory language does not exempt coordinating 
conduct that takes place prior to individuals becoming candidates.”179  
Furthermore, Elias argues that the policy underlying the coordination rules 
does not support exempting pre-candidate coordination, stating it would be 
inconsistent with the regulatory scheme and would allow individuals 
contemplating candidacy to finance their activities with funds that do not 
comply with federal restrictions.180  Lastly, Elias argues that because 11 
C.F.R. § 100.2(l)—which requires presidential candidates to reimburse 
certain pre-candidacy expenses paid for by multicandidate PACs during a 
specified time period181—specifically incorporates the language of the 
conduct standard of the coordinated communication regulations,182 the 
“FEC intended to examine the conduct of individuals prior to their 
becoming candidates in determining whether a contribution was made 
during the individual’s pre-candidacy period.”183  Adding to Elias’s 
argument, 11 C.F.R. § 9034.10, which requires presidential candidates who 
accept federal funds to reimburse multicandidate PACs for certain pre-
candidacy expenses, adopts this same language.184  “These provisions [11 
 
 174. See id. at 15. 
 175. Id. at 14 (emphasis added). 
 176. Id. at 12–14, 19. 
 177. Comments from Elias, supra note 163, at 6. 
 178. See Draft C, supra note 173, at 15. 
 179. AOR 2015-09, supra note 150, at 7. 
 180. Id. 
 181. 11 C.F.R. § 110.2(l)(1)(i) (2015) (“The expenditure is made on or after January 1 of 
the year immediately following the last Presidential election year . . . .”). 
 182. See supra notes 62–70 and accompanying text. 
 183. AOR 2015-09, supra note 150, at 7. 
 184. Compare 11 C.F.R. § 9034.10(a)(2) (“(a)  A payment by a multicandidate political 
committee is an in-kind contribution to, and qualified campaign expense by, a Presidential 
candidate, even though made before the individual becomes a candidate . . . if . . . (2)  With 
respect to the goods or services involved, the candidate accepted or received them, requested 
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C.F.R. §§ 100.2(l), 9034.10] were designed to address situations where 
unauthorized political committees closely associated with a particular 
individual planning to run for President defray costs that are properly 
treated as in-kind contributions unless reimbursed by the Presidential 
campaign.”185  This is arguably analogous to the conduct described in 
Advisory Opinion Request 2015-09, where prospective candidates, through 
coordination, would defray costs to single-candidate Super PACs that 
should be treated as contributions.  These provisions and the rationale 
behind them could demonstrate that the FEC did intend for noncandidate 
behavior to be included in determining whether a PAC made a coordinated 
communication, but the regulations just have not been updated to reflect the 
emergence of Super PACs. 
Because Draft E frames the issues in terms of triggering candidate 
status,186 it does not address whether coordination regulations apply to 
testing-the-waters candidates,187 despite being urged to do so in a comment 
submitted by Elias on behalf of SMP and HMP.188  Rather, Draft E only 
states that the FEC “need not and does not address whether material 
involvement in a communication by an individual before he or she becomes 
a candidate might meet the conduct standards in 11 C.F.R. § 109.21(d).”189 
b.  Triggering Candidate Coordination Regulations? 
These questions can also be examined by determining whether the 
described conduct triggers candidate status, subjecting the individuals to 
coordination regulations as candidates.  Draft E analyzes the relevant 
questions posed in Advisory Opinion Request 2015-09 through this lens. 
First, Draft E answers Question 7 by stating that an individual would 
trigger candidate status by participating in the formation of a single-
candidate Super PAC whose purpose is to support that individual’s 
candidacy.190  Draft E reasons that, because the proposed prospective 
candidate will participate in the formation of the single-candidate Super 
PAC whose stated purpose is to support the individual in candidacy, 
appoint that Super PAC’s leadership, and (borrowing from Question 2) 
share plans and activities used to create independent expenditures in 
 
or suggested their provision, was materially involved in the decision to provide them, or was 
involved in substantial discussions about their provision . . . .” (emphasis added)), with 11 
C.F.R. § 109.21(d)(1)–(3) (“(d)  Any one of the following types of conduct satisfies the 
conduct standard of this section . . . (1)(i)  The communication is created, produced, or 
distributed at the request or suggestion of a candidate . . . (2)  A candidate . . . is materially 
involved in decisions regarding [the communication] . . . (3)  The communication is created, 
produced, or distributed after one or more substantial discussions about the communication 
[with] . . . the candidate . . . .” (emphasis added)). 
 185. Public Financing of Presidential Candidates and Nominating Conventions, 68 Fed. 
Reg. 47,386, 47,407 (July 31, 2003) (codified as amended in scattered parts of 11 C.F.R.). 
 186. See infra Part II.B.2.b. 
 187. See Draft E, FEC Advisory Opinion 2015-09, at 19 n.10 (Nov. 6, 2015) [hereinafter 
Draft E], http://saos.fec.gov/aodocs/201509_4.pdf [https://perma.cc/6F39-LZ9R]. 
 188. Comments from Elias, supra note 163, at 7. 
 189. Draft E, supra note 187, at 19 n.10. 
 190. Id. at 7. 
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support of the individual after he becomes a candidate, the individual has 
given consent to the Super PAC to receive contributions and make 
expenditures on his behalf.191  Thus, Draft E argues, the proposed conduct 
would trigger candidate status once the Super PAC raised more than $5000 
because under FECA and FEC regulation, an individual meets the definition 
of a candidate if another person or committee, who has obtained consent 
from the individual to receive contributions or make expenditures on behalf 
of such individual, receives contributions or makes expenditures 
aggregating in excess of $5000.192  In support of this conclusion, Draft E 
cites FEC Advisory Opinion 1984-40, where the FEC concluded that a 
steering committee organized by the requestor’s “political associates and 
representatives” could trigger candidacy status if such committee engaged 
in activities on behalf of the individual’s candidacy.193 
This assertion arguably conflicts with Matter Under Review 6775, where 
the FEC dismissed an allegation that Hillary Clinton had triggered 
candidate status when her authorized committee from a past election (Ready 
for Hillary) rented its mailing list to a Super PAC (Ready for Hillary PAC), 
whose purpose was to encourage Hillary to run for office in 2016, and gave 
that Super PAC permission to use the hillaryclinton.com URL.194  The 
complaint alleged that 
by conveying the mailing list to Ready for Hillary PAC and permitting it 
to use the hillaryclinton.com URL, Clinton and Friends of Hillary were 
acting “in furtherance” of Ready for Hillary PAC’s stated goals and 
therefore, gave their consent for Ready for Hillary PAC to accept 
contributions and make expenditures on Clinton’s behalf,195 
triggering candidate status.  However, the FEC did not find that Clinton 
became a candidate.196  Draft E states that Advisory Opinion Request 2015-
09 is distinguishable from Matter Under Review 6775 for four reasons.  
First, Ready for Hillary PAC’s purpose was only to encourage Clinton to 
run, not support her if she did.  Second, Clinton and Ready for Hillary’s 
activities were confined to evaluating potential candidacy.  Third, there was 
no evidence that renting the mailing list or Ready for Hillary’s other 
activities were designed to amass funds for after Clinton became a 
candidate.  Finally, Clinton played no role in the formation of Ready for 
Hillary PAC.197 
Draft E further asserts that the prospective candidates’ active 
participation in forming and operating a single-candidate Super PAC by 
itself triggers candidate status because such conduct indicates that the 
 
 191. Id. at 7–8. 
 192. Id. (citing 52 U.S.C.A. § 30101(2) (West 2015)); accord 11 C.F.R. § 100.3 (2015). 
 193. Draft E, supra note 187, at 8–9 (citing AO 1985-40, supra note 91, at 10). 
 194. FEC Matter Under Review 6775 (Ready for Hillary PAC et al.), Factual and Legal 
Analysis, at 2–4 (Feb. 12, 2015) [hereinafter MUR 6775], http://eqs.fec.gov/eqsdocsMUR/ 
15044371447.pdf [https://perma.cc/FAH7-UZJN]. 
 195. Id. at 5. 
 196. Id. at 7. 
 197. Id. (citing MUR 6775, supra note 194, at 7–8). 
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individual has decided to become a candidate and is no longer merely 
testing the waters.  Draft E reasons that “[b]ecause independent 
expenditures, by definition, are made only after the individual becomes a 
candidate, an individual’s formation of a [Super PAC] whose purpose is to 
make such expenditures necessarily means that the individual would not be 
forming the [Super PAC] merely” to determine the feasibility of 
candidacy.198  Furthermore, Draft E asserts that any funds raised by the 
Super PAC would be spent after he or she became a candidate, and 
therefore, pursuant to 11 C.F.R. § 100.72(b)(2),199 the individual would 
trigger candidate status.200 
Draft E, in answering Question 10, asserts that, assuming the prospective 
candidate raised or spent more than $5000, the filming of a noncandidate 
discussing their achievements and qualifications for office by a Super PAC, 
for use in public communications supporting that noncandidate’s candidacy, 
would trigger candidate status because such conduct would indicate that the 
individual has decided to become a candidate.201  By quoting 11 C.F.R. 
§§ 100.72(b) and 100.131(b), which provides that examples of candidate 
triggering activities include “us[ing] general public political advertising to 
publicize his or her intention to campaign for Federal office”202 and 
“mak[ing] or authoriz[ing] written or oral statements that refer to him or her 
as a candidate for a particular office,”203 Draft E implies that the conduct 
described in Question 10 satisfies such regulations and, thus, triggers 
candidate status.204 
Although in discussing whether filming such footage would trigger 
candidate status, Draft E cites Advisory Opinion 1981-32, it fails to provide 
the relevant analysis.  In this advisory opinion, as discussed in Part I.B.1, 
the FEC approved fourteen activities proposed by Governor Askew.  
However, the FEC expressed concern with respect to two relevant 
activities: 
3.  Employment of a public relations consultant for the purpose of 
arranging and coordinating speaking engagements, disseminating copies 
of the Governor’s speeches, and arranging for the publication of articles 
by the Governor in newspapers and periodicals. 
13.  Preparation and printing of a biographical brochure and possibly 
photographs to be used in connection with speaking appearances by 
Governor Askew.205 
 
 198. Id. at 11 (citing 11 C.F.R. § 100.72(a) (2015)). 
 199. Title 11, section 100.72(b)(2) of the C.F.R. provides that “amass[ing] campaign 
funds that would be spent after he or she becomes a candidate” is an example of an activity 
indicating that the individual as decided to become a candidate. 11 C.F.R. § 100.72(b)(2). 
 200. Draft E, supra note 187, at 11. 
 201. Id. at 15. 
 202. 11 C.F.R. §§ 100.72(b)(3), 100.131(b)(3). 
 203. Id. §§ 100.72(b)(4), 100.131(b)(4). 
 204. See Draft E, supra note 187, at 15. 
 205. AO 1981-32, supra note 80, at 2–3. 
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The FEC explained that these activities “appear to project Governor Askew 
to the public as a person qualified to be taken seriously as a presidential 
contender, rather than as a means to ascertain if he would be so perceived 
by the public.”206  The opinion continues by stating that if either activity 
take[s] place in a factual context indicating that Governor Askew has 
moved beyond the deliberative process of deciding to become a candidate, 
and into the process of planning and scheduling public activities designed 
to heighten his political appeal to the electorate, then it is the 
Commission’s opinion that the activity would cease to be within the 
exemption, and candidacy would arise.207 
The proposed filming during the testing-the-waters phase is analogous to 
the activities proposed in Advisory Opinion 1981-32, as they both involve 
noncandidate involvement in the creation of media supporting them.  
Unlike in Advisory Opinion 1981-32, however, given that the requestor 
proposes to use the footage after the featured individual announces his 
candidacy,208 candidate status is arguably triggered.  Filming such footage 
would seemingly demonstrate that the individual has moved beyond 
deciding whether to become a candidate and into participating in activities 
“designed to heighten his political appeal to the electorate.”209  Although an 
in-depth analysis is missing from Draft E, the reasoning in Advisory 
Opinion 1981-32 seems to inform Draft E, as the draft opinion frames its 
answer to Question 10 in terms of whether the proposed filming would be 
used to evaluate prospective candidacy or to create campaign advertising.210 
That said, Matter Under Review 6533 is seemingly at odds with 
Advisory Opinion 1981-32.  In Matter Under Review 6533, the FEC 
dismissed a complaint against an individual, finding he had not triggered 
candidate status when videos that included references to him as a candidate 
were uploaded to YouTube.211  The FEC reasoned that during the period at 
issue, the videos were only available to a “small group” of individuals who 
viewed the videos to “obtain their reaction and advice.”212  The FEC 
concluded that “[u]nder these circumstances, the mere preparation, rather 
than dissemination, of campaign materials in advance of a declaration of 
candidacy does not by itself” trigger candidate status.213  Draft E 
distinguished Advisory Opinion Request 2015-09 from Matter Under 
Review 6533 by asserting that there is no indication that the proposed 
footage would be used for testing the waters (like obtaining reaction and 
 
 206. Id. at 4–5. 
 207. Id. at 5 (emphasis added). 
 208. Comments from Elias, supra note 163, at 7. 
 209. AO 1981-32, supra note 80, at 5. 
 210. See Draft E, supra note 187, at 16. 
 211. FEC Matter Under Review 6533 (Perry Haney et al.), Factual and Legal Analysis, at 
6 (Dec. 3, 2012) [hereinafter MUR 6533], http://eqs.fec.gov/eqsdocsMUR/12044322928.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/YQT6-VLAT]. 
 212. Id. at 5. 
 213. Id. at 6 (emphasis added). 
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advice of a small group); rather, the filming proposed in Advisory Opinion 
Request 2015-09 would be used to promote the individual’s candidacy.214 
Thus, in answering Question 3, Draft E concludes that the Super PAC 
may not film the noncandidate and then use the footage in a public 
communication because doing so would constitute a coordinated 
communication and an unlawful contribution from the Super PAC.215  The 
coordination analysis is much simpler once it is deemed that this conduct 
triggers candidate status because coordination regulations, without question, 
apply to candidates.216 
Draft E implements this same candidacy triggering analysis in answering 
Question 2, finding that a public communication created by a Super PAC 
from information about a noncandidate’s plans and strategies, which is 
aired after the noncandidate becomes a candidate, would be a coordinated 
communication and an unlawful contribution because the individual would 
be a candidate.217  However, in making this determination, Draft E reasons 
that the individual would become a candidate by filming the footage, that is, 
through the conduct proposed in Question 3, not by sharing strategies and 
plans, as proposed in Question 2 (Questions 2 and 3 were answered 
together).218  Draft E never directly addresses (granted the FEC was never 
directly asked) whether candidate status is triggered when an individual 
shares information about his plans, activities, or needs with a Super PAC 
for subsequent use in creating a public communication after the individual 
becomes a candidate.219  In reality, all Draft E states with regard to 
Question 2 is that a communication created from information provided by 
an individual who is a candidate (for some other reason) is a coordinated 
communication under FEC regulations.220  This, in actuality, is just a 
simple analysis of 11 C.F.R. § 109.21.221  Although Draft E potentially 
alludes to this type of conduct triggering candidate status by mentioning it 
as one of three factors in its analysis of Question 7222 (whether participating 
 
 214. Draft E, supra note 187, at 16. 
 215. Id. at 17.  Draft E gives an analysis of how the proposed activity in Question 2 
would satisfy the coordinated communication regulation in 11 C.F.R. § 109.21, including an 
explanation of how the conduct would be “material involvement” under the conduct prong. 
See id. at 18–19; see also supra note 66 (explaining the definition of material involvement). 
 216. See Draft E, supra note 187, at 17. 
 217. See id. 
 218. See id. at 16–17. 
 219. See id. at 17–20. 
 220. See id. 
 221. See supra Part I.B.2.  Draft E gives an analysis of how the proposed activity in 
Question 3 would satisfy the coordinated communication regulation in 11 C.F.R. § 109.21, 
including an explanation of how the conduct would be a “substantial discussion” under the 
conduct prong. See Draft E, supra note 187, at 18–19; see also supra note 67 (explaining the 
definition of a substantial discussion). 
 222. See Draft E, supra note 187, at 8 (“Here, Requestors propose to have the prospective 
candidates (1)  participate in the formation of [Super PACs] whose stated purpose is to 
‘support the individuals’ candidacies if they decide to run for office’ . . . (2)  appoint the 
[Super PAC’s] leadership . . . and (3)  share . . . information about their strategic plans, 
projects, activities, or needs’ and ‘campaign messaging and scheduling plans’ to enable the 
Single-Candidate Committees ‘immediately’ to run communications after the prospective 
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in forming a Super PAC triggers candidate status), this fact is not 
dispositive, and thus, Draft E does not truly address whether the conduct 
described in Question 2 would trigger candidacy. 
As discussed in Part II.B.2.a, Draft C bases its conclusions on the 
assumption that Advisory Opinion Request 2015-09 presupposes the 
individuals are not candidates.  Draft C asserts that when the individual’s 
state of mind is unknown, an objective analysis is conducted; however, 
Draft C concludes that, because the advisory opinion request includes “an 
individual, who would not otherwise be a candidate”223 within its questions, 
it is actually known that the individual is only contemplating candidacy, 
and thus, an objective candidacy triggering analysis is unwarranted.224  That 
said, Draft C does not completely foreclose on the possibility of the conduct 
described in Questions 1 and 3 triggering candidate status.  Draft C suggests 
that 
if the prospective candidates’ states of mind were unknown . . . [a]n 
individual’s active participation in the formation and operation of the 
contemplated [Super PACs], the sole purpose of which is to support that 
individual’s federal candidacy, or in the filming of video intended to be 
used to promote that individual’s federal candidacy, could evidence225 
that a decision to seek office has been made.226  However, Draft C then 
displays skepticism toward this statement by quoting Matter Under Review 
6533,227 where the FEC found that “the mere preparation, rather than 
dissemination, of campaign materials in advance of a declaration of 
candidacy” did not trigger candidacy.228 
c.  Jurisdictional Issues 
During the first open meeting discussing Advisory Opinion Request 
2015-09, FEC Commissioner Lee Goodman raised concerns that the FEC 
did not have jurisdiction over an individual’s activities before he or she 
becomes a candidate.229  Commissioner Goodman characterized the FEC’s 
jurisdiction over individuals testing the waters as “retroactive 
jurisdiction . . . we only assert . . . if you become a candidate later.”230  
Commissioner Ellen L. Weintraub, however, disagreed with this 
characterization, stating that “the testing the waters regulations do not 
extend the statute retroactively backwards . . . where we otherwise wouldn’t 
have jurisdiction,” but rather the regulations are “an exemption to what 
would otherwise be absolutely considered under the statute to be candidate 
 
candidates become candidates, including ‘independent expenditures in support of’ the 
candidates . . . .” (emphasis added)). 
 223. AOR 2015-09, supra note 150, at 4, 6–7 (emphasis added). 
 224. Draft C, supra note 173, at 12–13. 
 225. Id. at 13 (emphasis added). 
 226. Id. 
 227. Id. 
 228. See MUR 6533, supra note 211, at 6. 
 229. See Transcript, supra note 161. 
 230. Id. 
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activities” to allow “candidates a little bit of opportunity to . . . see if they 
could raise money for a viable candidacy.”231  Later, Charles Spies 
submitted a comment echoing Commissioner Goodman’s jurisdictional 
concerns.232 
The jurisdictional issues raised by Commissioner Goodman and Spies 
stem from two circuit court cases.  In FEC v. Machinists Non-Partisan 
Political League233 and FEC v. Florida for Kennedy Committee,234 the D.C. 
and Eleventh Circuits, respectively, held that the FEC lacked jurisdiction 
over draft groups—groups created to encourage an individual to run for 
office—because draft groups’ activities are not related in any way to a 
person who had decided to become a candidate.235 
Elias, on the other hand, submitted a comment arguing that the FEC does 
have jurisdiction.  He asserted that “for thirty years, the [FEC’s] jurisdiction 
over individuals ‘testing-the-waters’ for candidacy by imposing limits and 
source restrictions on the funds that can be used to pay for such activities 
has been unquestioned.”236  He then contended that no court case has 
successfully challenged the FEC’s jurisdiction already in existence, nor has 
any court suggested that the holding in Machinists Non-Partisan Political 
League applies to testing-the-waters candidates.237  Building on Elias’s 
point, the FEC has seemingly asserted unchallenged jurisdiction over 
testing-the-waters candidates in 11 C.F.R. §§ 100.72, 100.131, 110.2(l), and 
9034.10.  Furthermore, 11 C.F.R §§ 110.2(l) and 9034.10 assert jurisdiction 
not through certain behavior triggering candidate status; rather, the 
provisions act as a reach-back for certain expenditures made before 
candidacy to be considered contributions if and when candidacy is 
triggered.238 
 
 231. Id. 
 232. Comments from Spies & Tyrrell, supra note 165, at 1 (“We echo Commissioner 
Goodman’s stated concerns about the Commission’s assertion of jurisdiction over an 
individual, or a group supporting an individual, prior to his or her becoming a candidate.”). 
 233. 655 F.2d 380 (D.C. Cir. 1981). 
 234. 681 F.2d 1281 (11th Cir. 1982). 
 235. Fla. for Kennedy Comm., 681 F.2d at 1287 (“[The draft committee] can be subject to 
the FEC’s jurisdiction only if Senator Kennedy was a candidate during the period of [the 
draft committee’s] activities.”); Machinists Non-Partisan Political League, 655 F.2d at 395–
96. 
 236. Comments from Elias, supra note 163, at 7. 
 237. Id. 
 238. See 11 C.F.R. §§ 110.2(l), 9034.10 (2015); Public Financing of Presidential 
Candidates and Nominating Conventions, 68 Fed. Reg. 47,386, 47,407 (July 31, 2003) 
(codified as amended in scattered parts of 11 C.F.R.) (“The covered expenses in the new 
rules at 11 CFR 110.2(l) and 9034.10 would not trigger candidacy themselves, but would 
count as contributions in-kind and/or qualified campaign expenses if and when the individual 
benefiting becomes a candidate.”).  However, these regulations provide a cure if the 
candidate reimburses the multicandidate PAC within thirty days of becoming a candidate. 11 
C.F.R. §§ 110.2(l), 9034.10. 
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3.  Not Getting the Answers:  
Effects of a Deadlocked Advisory Opinion 
An advisory opinion requires a majority vote of four or more 
commissioners to be passed.239  FEC advisory opinions may be relied on by 
the advisory opinion requester and any person or group involved in 
activities which are “indistinguishable in all its material aspects with 
respect” to the activities described in such advisory opinion.240  Any person 
or group who satisfies this requirement and, in good faith, relies on an 
advisory opinion obtains a safe harbor against sanctions.241  That said, 
advisory opinions include a disclaimer that requestors may not rely on an 
advisory opinion if there is a change in facts material to the advisory 
opinion’s conclusions or subsequent developments in the law contravene 
the opinion.242 
On November 10, 2015, the FEC voted on the draft opinions for 
Advisory Opinion Request 2015-09.243  The commissioners voted on Draft 
C and Draft E, but both failed to obtain a majority.244  Ultimately, after 
some minor, unrelated amendments, the FEC passed Draft F by unanimous 
vote;245 however, Draft F does not answer any of the discussed questions, 
but rather simply states that “[t]he Commission could not approve a 
response to the remaining questions by the required four affirmative 
votes.”246  This failure to obtain a majority is unsurprising, as the structure 
of the FEC—comprised of three Republican commissioners and three 
Democrat commissioners—makes the commission prone to deadlock.247 
That said, the effects of deadlocked FEC advisory opinions—both when 
the FEC refuses to answer the questions or is completely deadlocked and 
fails to pass any opinion—are unclear.  The FEC has not directly addressed 
this issue and few courts have weighed in.  The courts that have weighed in 
have held that a deadlocked advisory opinion does not act as a safe harbor 
 
 239. 2 U.S.C. § 437c(c) (2012) (transferred to 52 U.S.C.A. § 30106(c) (West 2015)). 
 240. Id. § 437f(c)(1) (transferred to 52 U.S.C.A. § 30108(c)(1)); 11 C.F.R. § 112.5. 
 241. 2 U.S.C. § 437f(c)(1)(2) (transferred to 52 U.S.C.A. § 30108(c)(1)(2)) (providing 
that such individuals or groups shall not be subject to any sanction provided by “this Act or 
by chapter 95 or chapter 96 of Title 26”); 11 C.F.R. § 112.5. 
 242. See, e.g., AO 2015-09, supra note 23, at 9.  Subsequent developments in the law 
include, but are not limited to, statutes, regulations, advisory opinions, and case law. Id. 
 243. Certification, supra note 166, at 1. 
 244. Id. at 1–2.  Draft C failed by a vote of three-to-three, and Draft E failed by a vote of 
two-to-four. Id. 
 245. Id. at 1–3. 
 246. AO 2015-09, supra note 23, at 9. 
 247. See R. SAM GARRETT, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., DEADLOCKED VOTES AMONG 
MEMBERS OF THE FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION (FEC):  OVERVIEW AND POTENTIAL 
CONSIDERATIONS FOR CONGRESS 8 (2009), http://www.campaignfreedom.org/wp-
content/uploads/2009/08/CRS-2009-FEC-Votes.pdf (finding every deadlock studied 
involved party-line votes) [https://perma.cc/R74N-9DYU].  Even FEC Commissioner Lee 
Goodman admits that “Congress set [the FEC] up to gridlock.” Eric Lichtblau, F.E.C. Can’t 
Curb 2016 Election Abuse, Commission Chief Says, N.Y. TIMES (May 2, 2015), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/03/us/politics/fec-cant-curb-2016-election-abuse-
commission-chief-says.html?login=email&_r=0&mtrref=undefined&assetType=nyt_now 
[https://perma.cc/U6A5-345U]. 
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from enforcement.248  In Chamber of Commerce of the United States v. 
FEC,249 the D.C. Circuit held that a deadlocked FEC advisory opinion did 
not prevent the FEC from enforcing its rules at any time.250  After a 
deadlocked advisory opinion, the requestor or any person who intends on 
engaging in indistinguishable conduct may seek a declaratory judgment 
from a court to enjoin the FEC from bringing an enforcement proceeding 
against it in the future.251  In Hispanic Leadership Fund, Inc. v. FEC,252 
when deciding whether to grant a declaratory judgment, the Eastern District 
Court of Virginia held that the deadlocked FEC advisory opinion warranted 
neither Skidmore nor Chevron deference, as there was no basis for giving 
deference to one draft opinion over another, leaving the court to decide the 
case for itself.253  Citing this decision, then-FEC Vice Chair Ann Ravel and 
FEC Commissioner Ellen L. Weintraub argued in a written statement that 
“[t]he failure to issue an advisory opinion results in ‘no ruling, 
interpretation, nor opinion of the agency,’”254 leaving the requestor and 
others intending to engage in indistinguishable behavior in essentially the 
same position they were in before submitting the advisory opinion 
request.255 
On the other hand, others argue that a deadlocked advisory opinion is 
“nearly as good as a win.”256  Many argue that a deadlocked advisory 
opinion, in actuality, acts as a de facto license or green light to proceed with 
the proposed activity, as the requestor or other persons can be confident that 
the FEC will be unable to obtain the majority required for bringing an 
enforcement proceeding.257  This confidence is arguably not unfounded, as 
 
 248. Chamber of Commerce of the U.S. v. FEC, 69 F.3d 600, 603 (D.C. Cir. 1995); 
Hispanic Leadership Fund, Inc. v. FEC, 897 F. Supp. 2d 407, 419 (E.D. Va. 2012). 
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the fact.”); Nicholas Confessore, Democrats Lay Groundwork to Expand Use of ‘Super 
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even Ann Ravel, who was then the FEC Chairwoman, admitted that the 
FEC is “worse than dysfunctional,” and “[t]he likelihood of the laws being 
enforced is slim.”258  Additionally, some criticize Hispanic Leadership 
Fund and Chamber of Commerce, arguing that, even if the FEC could 
somehow reach a majority, “basic notions of fairness would almost 
certainly stand in the way of a Commission” bringing an enforcement 
proceeding, especially against the requestor.259 
Elias (and SMP and HMP) will likely interpret the FEC’s indecision in 
Advisory Opinion 2015-09 as a de facto license to proceed with the 
proposed activities.  From the very beginning, Elias wrote in his advisory 
opinion request that, although he had “serious doubts about the 
permissibility of many of the activities[,] . . . the PACs cannot cede 
strategic advantage to their political competitors.”260  The Campaign Legal 
Center and Democracy 21 even accused Elias of submitting his advisory 
opinion request for the purpose of obtaining a deadlocked opinion that he 
could use as de facto authorization.261  Nevertheless, in a concurring 
opinion, Commissioner Weintraub issued a warning to those who might 
interpret the deadlocked advisory opinion as de facto approval.  She stated 
that there was more agreement within the FEC about prospective 
candidates’ involvement in Super PACs triggering candidate status than one 
might think and that “political actors and the practitioners who counsel 
them would be well-advised to take notice and act accordingly.”262 
Commissioner Weintraub’s warning aside—as even she admitted that she 
knows better than to predict how her warnings would play out in an 
enforcement context263—it seems as though the deadlocked advisory 
opinion did very little to clear up whether the testing-the-waters 
candidate/Super PAC interactions described in the advisory opinion request 
trigger candidate status or constitute illegal coordination.  Even if Advisory 
Opinion 2015-09 has no effect on the legal status of the behavior—and in 
theory, the FEC could still conduct an enforcement proceeding—political 
actors will likely bet on the FEC’s inability to obtain a majority and treat 
the advisory opinion as de facto authorization.  Thus, the ultimate result of 
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Advisory Opinion 2015-09 is that the legal status of the described 
conduct—including both the questions of candidate status and pre-
candidacy coordination—is largely unclear under current regulations. 
III.  DEBATING THE NEED FOR FURTHER REGULATION 
With political actors likely to interpret Advisory Opinion 2015-09 as de 
facto authorization, the question of whether steps should be taken to restrict 
individuals’ pre-candidacy involvement with Super PACs emerges.  This 
part explores the differing views on the constitutionality and desirability of 
restricting pre-candidacy coordination, with Part III.A focusing on those 
opposing such restrictions and Part III.B focusing on those supporting them. 
A.  First Amendment Defenders 
Any restriction in campaign finance must strike the proper balance 
between protecting the First Amendment and preventing corruption.264  
Opponents of regulating testing-the-waters candidates’ involvement with 
Super PACs would argue that any such limit would impermissibly burden 
the First Amendment.265  Opponents would assert that restrictions on such 
behavior could not be narrowly tailored to prevent quid pro quo corruption 
or the appearance thereof, as required by the Supreme Court.266  Although 
the Court held that groups and individuals’ interactions with candidates 
present a sufficient danger of corruption, opponents would contend that the 
Court did not recognize this threat of corruption in noncandidates.267  
Additionally, opponents would argue that current FEC regulations 
sufficiently guard against corruption, as individuals cannot coordinate with 
Super PACs once they become candidates, which is when such individuals 
would actually benefit from Super PAC expenditures.268 
Furthermore, opponents would assert that, by narrowing the justifications 
sufficient to restrict First Amendment rights, the Citizens United Court 
expanded First Amendment protections of political speech and heightened 
the rigor required to prove sufficient corruption.269  Opponents would 
contend that even if the Court found that noncandidate behavior could 
potentially present the narrow form of corruption required, limitations on 
testing-the-waters candidates’ interactions with Super PACs could not be 
sustained.  Such regulations, opponents would argue, would be overly 
inclusive, essentially giving the FEC authority to regulate the daily 
 
 264. See supra Part I.A. 
 265. Comments from Spies & Tyrrell, supra note 165, at 1–2.  In his comment, Spies 
criticized regulating testing-the-waters candidates’ interactions with Super PACs, arguing 
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 267. See supra Part I.A. 
 268. See supra Part I.B.1. 
 269. See supra note 36 and accompanying text. 
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activities and relationships of any individual and restrict indispensable 
political speech.270  This, they would assert, would be an unsustainable 
burden on the First Amendment and contravene the Court’s expansive 
protections of political speech.271  Furthermore, in his comment to the FEC, 
Charles Spies argued that such regulations would have unintended 
consequences on other organizations, such as extending testing-the-waters 
restrictions to apply to noncandidates’ interactions with other groups, such 
as nonprofit corporations.272  These arguments echo those made by 
opponents of broad coordination regulations, who assert that such 
regulations impermissibly interfere with normal political communications 
and lead to overenforcement.273 
Opponents also would likely raise the jurisdictional issues discussed in 
Part II.B.1.d.  Lastly, opponents would assert that increasing restrictions on 
testing-the-waters activities would contradict the purpose of the testing-the-
waters exemptions, which were created so as to not discourage individuals 
from pursuing a variety of activities to determine if candidacy is viable.274  
Further regulating testing-the-waters candidates, opponents would contend, 
would discourage individuals from considering candidacy, as they would 
want to avoid accidentally or unknowingly subjecting themselves to 
regulations with potentially harsh penalties. 
B.  Corruption and Ensuring Independence 
On the other hand, proponents of regulating testing-the-waters 
candidates’ interactions with Super PACs would argue that such regulations 
are essential for preventing the type of corruption articulated by the 
Supreme Court.275  Proponents would assert that an individual’s 
participation in forming a Super PAC that will support him, sharing plans 
and strategy for candidacy, and coordinating to create public 
communications presents exactly the type of danger of quid quo pro or 
appearance of quid pro quo corruption the Court described.276  In fact, 
proponents would contend, this is clearly demonstrated by current FEC 
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regulations, which limit how a candidate may engage in these exact 
activities.277  Such regulations restrict Super PAC expenditures created 
from a substantial discussion with a candidate, which is defined in FEC 
regulations as receiving information about such candidate’s campaign 
plans, projects, activities, or needs.278  Additionally, such regulations 
restrict a candidate’s ability to appear in Super PAC advertisements.279  
According to the FEC, such conduct makes it highly implausible that the 
candidate was not materially involved with its creation,280 which is 
restricted by FEC regulation.281  Proponents would argue that these very 
same dangers of corruption are not alleviated merely because the 
individuals have taken care not to trigger candidate status.282 
Additionally, proponents would assert that allowing such pre-candidacy 
involvement with Super PACs threatens the requirement that Super PACs 
only make expenditures that are independent.  Proponents would argue that 
Citizens United and SpeechNow.org emphasized the noncoordinated nature 
of independent expenditures, which quells concerns of corruption.283  As 
the District Court for the District of Columbia put it, “[T]here can be little 
doubt that the independence of independent expenditures is the lynchpin 
that holds together the principle that no limits can be placed on 
contributions for such expenditures,” and without such independence, “the 
doctrine carefully crafted in Citizens United and SpeechNow would begin to 
tumble back to Earth.”284  In differentiating between coordinated and 
independent expenditures, the Supreme Court characterized independent 
expenditures as those that are “truly,”285 “wholly,”286 or “totally”287 
independent.288  Proponents would argue that failing to regulate pre-
candidacy involvement in Super PACs that will support that individual in 
candidacy allows Super PACs to disguise coordinated expenditures as 
independent expenditures.  This, proponents would assert, enables Super 
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2016] LIMITING PRE-CANDIDACY COORDINATION 1727 
PACs to evade contribution and expenditure limits and continue to reap the 
benefits of being a Super PAC,289 even though the PAC is no longer an 
independent expenditure-only committee. 
Proponents would argue that the true independence of Super PAC 
expenditures is essential for the functionality of campaign finance law in a 
post-Citizens United political and regulatory landscape.290  Although Super 
PACs would not be able to coordinate with individuals after the individual 
became a candidate, this restriction, proponents would argue, is insufficient 
to maintain true independence.  Proponents would reason that Super PACs 
would already have all the information needed to operate in a coordinated 
manner and make expenditures, rendering any subsequent coordination 
unnecessary and, ultimately, existing coordination regulations 
ineffective.291  These arguments mirror those made by proponents of 
stricter coordination regulations, who argue that existing coordination 
regulations undermine the Supreme Court’s emphasis on true independence 
and do not effectively guard against corruption.292  Proponents of further 
testing-the-waters regulations, like their counterparts arguing for stricter 
coordination restrictions, would assert that current FEC regulations “are 
based on an older model of independent committee—in which the 
committee had independent existence long before the current election; had a 
set of political, ideological, and policy goals in addition to the election of a 
specific candidate” and was not “functionally tied to the candidate.”293 
IV.  UPDATING THE OUTDATED:  
PROPOSING NEW REGULATIONS 
New regulations should be adopted to restrict testing-the-waters 
candidates’ interaction with Super PACs that will support them in 
candidacy.  The failure of regulators to update regulations adequately in 
response to rapid changes in campaign finance post-Citizens United and 
SpeechNow.org294 has resulted in individuals subverting campaign finance 
restrictions.295  The exploitation of these antiquated regulations has 
undermined the key facet of Citizens United that allows for Super PACs to 
exist:  the independence of an independent expenditure.296  With the 
politically divided FEC likely to remain stagnant,297 individuals will 
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continue to delay candidacy to exploit impermissibly the testing-the-waters 
phase to prepare for candidacy in an otherwise unlawful manner.  These 
individuals will continue to create Super PACs run by people of their 
choosing that are equipped with plans, strategies, and content to make so-
called “independent” expenditures not subject to the spending, fundraising, 
or source restrictions that nearly identical expenditures would be subject 
to.298 
New regulations are necessary not to combat Citizens United, but rather 
to ensure that the regulatory scheme in place effectively enforces that 
decision.  Although the FEC will likely still face enforcement issues even 
with new regulations, adopting clear and comprehensive regulations will 
help facilitate better enforcement and act as a strong deterrent against such 
conduct.  This part proposes two sets of regulations designed to restrict this 
conduct, both of which should be adopted by the FEC.  Part IV.A discusses 
the first proposal, which revises the coordination regulations.  Part IV.B 
discusses the second proposal, which updates the testing-the-waters 
regulations concerning triggering candidacy. 
A.  Proposal #1:  
Curbing Testing-the-Waters Coordination 
To incorporate pre-candidacy coordination into existing coordination 
regulations, the FEC should adopt the following regulation: 
 
For the purposes of 11 CFR 109.21(d)(1) through (d)(3), “candidate” 
shall include an individual who satisfies all of the following: 
(1) The individual engaged in conduct, while not yet a candidate 
under 11 CFR 100.3, that would otherwise satisfy 11 CFR 
109.21(d)(1), (d)(2), or (d)(3), but for the individual not being a 
candidate under 11 CFR 100.3; 
(2) Subsequent to the conduct described in subsection (1), the 
individual became a candidate under 11 CFR 100.3; 
(3) The conduct described in subsection (1) occurred on or after 
January 1 of the year immediately following the last election for 
the Federal office in which such individual subsequently became 
a candidate under 11 CFR 100.3; and 
(4) The individual is: 
(ii)  The clearly identified candidate in a communication that 
satisfies 11 CFR 109.21(c); or 
(iii)  The opponent of the clearly identified candidate in a 
communication that satisfies 11 CFR 109.21(c).299 
 
This regulation would essentially add a reach-back period to three 
subparts of the conduct prong in FEC coordination regulation 11 C.F.R. 
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§ 109.21 by incorporating certain noncandidates into the definition of 
candidates for the purpose of those subparts.300  The regulation would only 
apply when the candidate would otherwise have satisfied 11 C.F.R. 
§§ 109.21(d)(1), (d)(2), or (d)(3) but for the fact that the conduct—(d)(1) 
the request or suggestion; (d)(2) the material involvement; or (d)(3) the 
substantial discussion—occurred when he or she was not yet a candidate.  
In other words, this regulation would expand the coordination regulations to 
instances where the coordination occurred while the individual was not a 
candidate and that individual subsequently reaped the benefits of a 
communication during candidacy, which, in reality, was coordinated, but 
was not subject to the limitations normally placed on such expenditures.  
Thus, this regulation would prevent individuals and Super PACs from 
exploiting pre-candidacy to circumvent coordination regulations and help 
ensure the independence of independent expenditures. 
This proposed regulation avoids several of the criticisms described in 
Part III.A.  First, the proposed regulation is not overly broad, as it only 
encompasses conduct during a specified period of time.  This time period—
starting on or after January 1st of the year of the last election for the 
specific office in which the individual eventually runs—only targets a 
portion of the time between elections, the period of time in which 
individuals are most likely to be preparing for candidacy.  Additionally, the 
language of the regulation provides for the time period to differ depending 
on which federal election is at issue. 
Similarly, the proposed regulation is not overly broad because it would 
apply to only individuals who actually become candidates and benefit from 
a coordinated expenditure that satisfies existing regulations.  Thus, the 
proposed regulation would not expand the types of activities covered by 
coordination regulations nor be overly encompassing by regulating those 
who never become candidates.  This combats the related criticisms of a lack 
of jurisdiction,301 as the proposed regulation would only regulate 
candidates’ noncandidate conduct, not assert jurisdiction over 
noncandidates. 
This regulation is also consistent with current FEC regulations:  11 
C.F.R. §§ 110.2(l) and 9034.10 assert similar reach-back jurisdiction over 
pre-candidacy interactions with multicandidate PACs302 and provide for the 
same applicable time period.303  Additionally, 11 C.F.R. §§ 110.2(l) and 
9034.10 were adopted to combat similar conduct, as they “were designed to 
address situations where unauthorized political committees closely 
associated with a particular individual planning to run for [office] defray 
costs that are properly treated as in-kind contributions.”304 
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B.  Proposal #2:  
Triggering Candidacy 
The FEC should also update the existing testing-the-waters regulations 
concerning triggering candidate status.  Providing for noncandidates’ 
involvement with Super PACs to trigger candidate status would further 
prevent evasion of campaign finance law.  Such behavior would trigger all 
regulations applicable to candidates, including those beyond restrictions on 
coordination.305  This section proposes three candidacy-triggering 
regulations.  Part IV.B.1 proposes two regulations that add certain conduct 
to the existing list of activities that trigger candidacy.  Part IV.B.2 proposes 
a regulation that would create a rebuttable presumption of candidacy for 
certain other conduct. 
1.  Adding to the List 
The FEC should adopt the following two regulations as subparts (b)(6) 
and (b)(7), respectively, of 11 C.F.R. §§ 100.72 and 100.131.  These new 
subparts would add to the nonexhaustive list of “activities that indicate an 
individual has decided to become a candidate”306: 
 
(6) The individual, either directly or through his or her agents, 
participates in the formation of an independent expenditure-only 
political action committee (“Super PAC”) whose purpose is, in 
whole or in part, to support that individual during candidacy.  
This participation includes, but is not limited to, appointing that 
Super PAC’s leadership. 
(7) The individual, either directly or through his or her agents, shares 
plans, strategies, projects, activities, or needs for candidacy with 
a Super PAC whose purpose is, in whole or in part, to support 
that individual during candidacy.307 
 
These additions would not change the structure or enforcement of the 
existing testing-the-waters regulations.308 Thus, the regulations would not 
raise jurisdictional issues, but rather would only update the existing 
regulations to reflect changes in campaign finance that have occurred with 
the rise of Super PACs.  These regulations are necessary because the 
regulation proposed in Part IV.A would only apply in instances where the 
noncandidate’s conduct led to the creation of a communication. 
These regulations strike a balance between being over- and 
underinclusive.  To trigger candidate status, the testing-the-waters candidate 
must engage in the listed conduct with a Super PAC whose purpose is to 
support that candidate during candidacy.  This potentially could provide an 
 
 305. See supra Part I.B.2. 
 306. See supra note 92. 
 307. The author of this Note created these proposed regulations. 
 308. See supra Part I.C. 
2016] LIMITING PRE-CANDIDACY COORDINATION 1731 
avenue for circumvention, as Super PACs could avoid revealing that their 
purpose is to support a particular candidate until after the individual 
otherwise becomes a candidate.  That said, if the FEC brought an 
enforcement proceeding after the individual otherwise became a 
candidate—for example, through a formal declaration of candidacy—
support by such Super PAC after this formal announcement would be 
strong evidence that the Super PAC’s purpose was to support that 
individual’s candidacy when the conduct in question initially occurred.  
Additionally, the regulation proposed in Part IV.A would guard against 
total circumvention.  Even if an individual avoided triggering candidate 
status, the reach-back period proposed in that regulation could potentially 
incorporate such pre-candidacy conduct into the coordinated expenditure 
restrictions.  Despite these potential issues, this qualifier is necessary.  
Without it, the regulation would be overinclusive, as it could potentially 
apply to all individuals’ interactions with any Super PAC.  It also is 
necessary to ensure the proposed regulations are consistent with current 
FEC regulations, which emphasize that only actions targeted toward 
candidacy trigger candidate status.309 
On the other hand, the regulations avoid being underinclusive by 
applying only to a Super PAC whose purpose is, in whole or in part, to 
support such individual’s candidacy.  This prevents Super PACs from 
circumventing the regulations by simply supporting more than one 
candidate.  Additionally, this extra restriction is important because the 
danger of corruption is present regardless of whether the Super PAC is a 
single-candidate Super PAC or supports more than one candidate. 
2.  The Rebuttable Presumption 
The FEC should adopt the following regulation as subpart (c) of 11 
C.F.R. §§ 100.72 and 100.131: 
 
(c) An individual’s participation in the planning or production of a 
communication, of the kind described in 11 CFR 109.21(c), with 
an independent expenditure-only political action committee 
(“Super PAC”) whose purpose is, in whole or in part, to support 
that individual during candidacy, in a manner that satisfies 11 
CFR 109.21(d)(1), (d)(2), or (d)(3), creates a rebuttable 
presumption that the individual has become a candidate.  In the 
context of enforcement, an expenditure for such communication 
by the Super PAC, in satisfaction of 11 CFR 109.21, after the 
individual makes a formal announcement of candidacy or files a 
statement of candidacy with the FEC, is strong evidence that the 
individual became a candidate when he or she participated in the 
planning or production of such communication.310 
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This regulation would create a rebuttable presumption of candidacy in 
instances where an individual participated in the planning or production of a 
communication of the type listed in the content prong of the coordination 
regulation311 and in a manner described in the conduct prong of the 
coordination regulation312 with a Super PAC whose purpose is to support 
such individual’s candidacy.  Thus, for example, the filming of a 
prospective candidate by a Super PAC whose purpose is to support that 
individual’s candidacy would create a rebuttable presumption of candidacy.  
In an enforcement proceeding, the individual could then provide evidence 
that he had not yet decided to become a candidate and that his participation 
in the planning or production of such communication was not geared 
toward his candidacy. 
Because the new regulation would encompass a broad variety of conduct, 
the proposed regulation would only create a rebuttable presumption of 
candidacy.  Under this presumption, candidacy would be easier to dispel, as 
compared to the regulations proposed in Part IV.B.1 and 11 C.F.R. 
§§ 100.72 and 100.131.  That said, the proposed regulation provides that, if 
such Super PAC makes an expenditure in satisfaction of the coordinated 
communication regulations313 after the individual otherwise becomes a 
candidate, the presumption becomes more difficult to rebut.  This provision 
ensures enforcement in the most obvious cases of coordination.  
Furthermore, the requirement that the Super PAC’s purpose must be, in 
whole or in part, to support that individual during candidacy provides the 
same balance of inclusiveness as the regulations proposed in Part IV.B.1.  
Additionally, although this regulation does not simply add to an existing list 
like the regulations proposed in Part IV.B.1, there are no jurisdictional 
issues because this proposal regulates testing-the-waters candidates in the 
same manner as existing regulations. 
Lastly, it is important to note how this proposed regulation relates to the 
coordination regulation proposed in Part IV.A.  Technically, an individual 
who satisfies the regulation proposed in Part I.A also would satisfy the 
proposed regulation in this section.  Triggering candidate status would 
essentially preempt the need for the regulation proposed in Part IV.A, as 
existing coordination regulations would apply to that individual as a 
candidate.  Nevertheless, the regulation proposed in this section would be 
more encompassing.  Unlike the regulation proposed in Part IV.A, the 
described conduct could have legal significance before the airing of a 
communication and triggering candidate status would subject an individual 
to regulations beyond coordination restrictions.314  Additionally, although 
satisfying the proposed regulation in Part IV.A would be strong evidence 
that candidacy was triggered when the individual engaged in the conduct, 
doing so still would create only a rebuttable presumption under the 
regulation proposed in this section.  Thus, adopting both sets of regulations 
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would give the FEC multiple tools to combat pre-candidacy coordination.  
The two regulations, however, also could be alternatives for the FEC to 
choose from when considering adopting new regulations.  While perhaps 
more difficult to enforce, the regulation proposed in this section would have 
more legal consequences; on the other hand, while easier to enforce, the 
regulation proposed in Part IV.A only would regulate coordination. 
CONCLUSION 
The current campaign finance regulatory system fails to adequately 
address the post-Citizens United political realities.  The failure of regulators 
to revise regulations to keep pace with the rapid developments in campaign 
finance has allowed political actors to exploit these outdated regulations.  
By abusing the testing-the-waters phase to prepare for candidacy in an 
otherwise unlawful manner, candidates have undermined the Supreme 
Court’s holding Citizens United and transformed independent expenditure-
only committees into coordinated campaign machines.  Adopting the 
proposed regulations will help align the regulatory system with the spirit of 
Citizens United and better equip the FEC with the tools to operate in the 
modern campaign finance and political landscape. 
